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Filozofia i Nauka

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Filozofia i Nauka | 2025 | tom 13

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Abstract

This article examines the main ideas of the metaphysics of the prominent American logician and philosopher Charles Sanders Peirce. It is shown that a significant part of his "scientific metaphysics" is evolutionary cosmology, characterized, in particular, by the essential role of randomness in the world. Among the innovative ideas of evolutionary cosmology, the idea of the chaotic beginning of the Universe and constructive understanding of randomness stands out. The paper shows that this idea echoes some modern problems of quantum-relativistic cosmology, and first of all, the problems of the still popular "inflationary model," in which the idea of the chaotic beginning of the evolution of the Universe is one of the central ones.
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Authors and Affiliations

Volodymyr Ratnikov
1

  1. National TechnicalUniversity, Vinnytsia, Ukraine
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Abstract

“Phenomenoscopic analysis” differs from the phenomenological analysis of the vision of the essence of phenomena highlighted, with an appropriate intentional act, as pure object; phenomenoscopic analysis instead regards this vision as organically linked to the phenomenal appearing of the physical meaning inherent in the experimental datum identified and expressed mathematically; therefore, said vision is not pure but rather integrated with “visivation,” i.e. the highlighting of the factor, also phenomenal, which constitutes the necessary condition for its actual appearing. This factor is not immediately visible because it transpires from within the datum perceived on the surface. It is only “intravisible” and therefore must be shown by means of a particular thought experiment: one suitably reintegrated with its inalienable visual-perceptual component and thus qualified—more so than the kind generally employed in philosophical and scientific demonstrations—to make visible the crucial factor otherwise unseen or merely glimpsed. For this reason, said factor is not taken into account in the intuitive and not strictly perceptual visualisation of the physical meaning, which thus remains devoid of that phenomenal visibility which makes the indispensable empirical verification possible (according to Wittgenstein’s words: “The inexpressible certainly exists. It shows itself”). As a proof of the validity of this different methodological and epistemological approach, here we present a phenomenoscopic analysis of the mental experiments—singularly alike in this regard— developed, on the one hand, by zeno of elea in the kinematic paradox of Achilles and, on the other hand, by Einstein in his Special Theory of Relativity demonstrations. The phenomenoscopic analysis of the intravisible, therefore, highlights the fact that the discovery of the essence of phenomenal reality requires not the separation but, on the contrary, the mutual integration of the scientific point of view and the philosophical one, both necessary, while maintaining their respective functions distinct. Indeed, it is first and foremost the mathematical recognition of the real datum that enables logical deduction to pose the ensuing theoretical problem in the correct terms; the demonstration that it is in line with the real data and with the objective solution to the actual problems is up to their “visivation,” which allows one to glimpse their phenomenal essence and the metaphysical meaning inherent in the physical one. Ultimately, it follows that the objectivity of scientific and philosophical knowledge is not founded on unilateral “phenomenological evidence”, which is inevitably subjective (as Jan Łukasiewicz acutely observed and highlighted in contrast to Edmund Husserl), but rather on a homogeneous, integrated synergy between science and philosophy which preserves their distinct but correlated functions.
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Authors and Affiliations

Giorgio Derossi
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Abstract

There are at least two notions of coincidents: a narrower one — proposed by Zdzisław Augustynek and introduced into the ontology of spacetime – and an adequate one, which — despite the lack of its definition — corresponds to point objects in physics. In this article, we (1) reconstruct the definition of narrower coincidents and (2) discuss their specific types. Next, (3) we draw attention to the problem with this understanding of the term “coincident” and make an attempt to extend the notion of coincident so that its legitimacy comes not from metaphysics but from physics. Finally, (4) we consider the status of coincidents — both narrower and adequate ones – in ontologies other than point-eventism.
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Authors and Affiliations

Maciej Raźniak
1
ORCID: ORCID

  1. Szkoła Doktorska Nauk Humanistycznych, UniwersytetWarszawski, ul. Dobra 56/66, pok. 0.108, 00-312 Warszawa
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Abstract

This article is concerned with a distinction between two epistemic roles that, according to Michael Dummett, deductively valid arguments could play in communication. This means the distinction between: a) arguments that purport to explain, and b) arguments that purport to persuade. The article is also concerned with a resulting shift in the appropriate approach to these roles of arguments. In this respect, for example, an idea emerges which traditionally any realistic-minded author would have automatically dismissed as unthinkable, but which is now relevant. This is the idea of circular justification of knowledge as something rationally acceptable. The distinction also leads us to the view that we do not need anyone to convince us that the rules of correct deduction are valid. In fact, we are already convinced of the validity of the forms of inference that guide us at the moment we think about the deductively valid arguments. There should consequently be no authentic context in which we need to be persuaded of their validity. The present article attempts to reflect critically on the distinction between the epistemic roles of arguments, and on the resulting shift in the methodology, by making four critical objections to its presentation.
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Authors and Affiliations

Tomáš Čanal
1

  1. University of Ss. Cyril and Methodiusin Trnava, Slovakia
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Abstract

This paper examines the historical and contemporary challenges in the development of artificial intelligence. Replicating the human mind—with its intentionality, self-awareness, and creativity—has been, from its inception, a major challenge in artificial intelligence (AI) research. A fundamental issue remains the inability of AI systems to address “why?” and “for what purpose?” questions, underscoring the distinction between machines and humans in terms of meaning-making and contextual interpretation.

Contemporary technologies, such as neural networks and deep learning, aim to emulate cognitive mechanisms observed in biological systems. Nonetheless, limitations such as the “frame problem” and the inability to simulate intentional states persist as significant barriers in the development of these systems. These challenges have prompted an interdisciplinary approach, integrating engineering, philosophy, psychology, and biology, and have led to the emergence of the concept of “naturalness” in AI design. This concept emphasizes mimicking not only cognitive functions but also the adaptive and goal-directed processes characteristic of the human mind.
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Authors and Affiliations

Mariusz Mazurek
1

  1. Institute of Philosophy and Sociology of the PolishAcademy of Sciences, Nowy Świat 72, 00-330 Warsaw
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Abstract

The subject matter of this article fits into the debate on cognitive possibilities in social sciences, with particular emphasis on the application of expert methods in isolation methods. Specifically, the focus is on the Delphi and the idealization and concretization methods. The aim of the article is to attempt to answer the research question: Will the use of the Delphi method allow for the formulation of components of an ontological perspective that can be utilized in the process of idealizing phenomena in the field of economics and management? Achieving this objective aims to demonstrate how the mechanism of identifying the principal factor, based on logical and abstract reasoning (reliable inference) inherent in the method of idealization, can be replaced by a mechanism based on the idea of collective intelligence (nonreliable inference).
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Authors and Affiliations

Sławomir Czetwertyński
1
Jakub Marcinkowski
2

  1. Katedra Mikroekonomii i Ekonomii Instytucjonalnej, Uniwersytet Ekonomiczny we Wrocławiu, ul. Komandorska 118/120, Wrocław
  2. Katedra Zarządzania Strategicznego i Logistyki, Uniwersytet Ekonomiczny we Wrocławiu, ul. Komandorska 118/120, Wrocław
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Abstract

The paper begins by identifying two opposing approaches to (shared) agency— the standard model and the dynamical model. Despite differences between them, both models essentially converge upon the belief that shared agency entails direct mutual influence between agents, in the form of either mutual control or mutual responsiveness, respectively. This assumption becomes problematic when applied to interdisciplinary practices, like interdisciplinary research, which involve role specialization and thus do not lend themselves to an explanation in terms of direct mutual influence. In response to this difficulty, the paper advances a third approach— referred to here as the regulatory model (e.g., Schore, 2000)—which explains shared agency in terms of loose coupling (Gruber, Bödeker, 2005) understood as a pattern of cyclical organization of action in the course of which different positions (perspectives, agendas) are first differentiated during the exploratory phase and then integrated, giving rise to a dialogical from of self-organization.
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Authors and Affiliations

Anna Martin
1

  1. Institute of Philosophy and Sociology of the PolishAcademy of Sciences
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Abstract

There is a number of historical testimonies that can be retrospectively, and therefore with a great deal of uncertainty, considered to be about persons on the autism spectrum. There are also testimonies that can provide some background for the creation of the diagnostic entity of autism in the 40’s of the 20th century. The paper aims to give historical and, especially, philosophical context to selected examples of such testimonies (of Herodotus, Salimbene de Adam da Parma, St. Augustine, and Martin Luther). The original research contribution of the article is, in particular, an attempt to include testimony of the Book I of Augustine’s Confessions (among other works of other authors) to the list of those already described in the secondary literature on autism. The category of affective contact, coined by Leo Kanner, co-creator of the diagnostic unit of autism is also contextualized, as a counterweight to earlier, morally charged historical approaches. The conclusions from these multi-track analyses are of two types: firstly, what general sources of knowledge, given the nature of autism itself (as it was originally defined in child psychiatry), are possible and ethically justified in the study, and, secondly, what, through the eyes of a historian of philosophy, can be learned (and unlearned) in a practical sense today by studying past alleged reports of neurodevelopmental disorders.
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Authors and Affiliations

Bogna Kosmulska
1

  1. Wydział Filozofii Uniwersytetu Warszawskiego
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Abstract

The paper considers the currently widely accepted as standard and unquestionable (among others in the essay Instrumental Rationality in The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy) concept of instrumental rationality based on the descriptivenormative definition: one should choose/one chooses those means that are effective for a given end. I analyze what problems are generated by postulating in this concept of rationality the end of action as known ex ante, i.e. in the phase of planning the action, and with undetermined values, and postulating means on which no values are imposed except for the effectiveness of the action. I also indicate the differences between the currently paradigmatic concept of instrumental rationality and the more insightful concept of Max Weber regarding the nature of the end, means and their values.
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Authors and Affiliations

Małgorzata Czarnocka
1

  1. Instytut Filozofii i Socjologii PAN, ul. Nowy Świat 72, 00-330 Warszawa

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INFORMACJE DLA AUTORÓW

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1. Przyjmujemy teksty rozpraw i studiów do 1,5 arkusza wydawniczego (60 000 znaków ze spacjami), polemik i głosów w dyskusjach – do 0,5 arkusza (20 000 znaków ze spacjami), recenzji – do 0,4 arkusza (około 16 000 znaków ze spacjami). W uzasadnionych przypadkach dopuszczamy wyjątki. Należy je uzgodnić wcześniej z zespołem redakcyjnym.

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3. Cytowanie pozycji literatury powinno zostać przygotowane według poniższego schematu:

Monografie:

Max Scheler, Problemy socjologii wiedzy, przeł. Stanisław Czerniak et al., PWN, Warszawa 1990, s. 32.

Artykuły w czasopismach:

Nelson Goodman, What Should Not Be Said about Representation?, Journal of Aesthetics and Art Criticism, 1987–8, v. 46, s. 419–425.

Rozprawy w monografiach zbiorowych:

E. Mayr, Die Darwinsche Revolution und die Wider‐ stände gegen die Selektionstheorie, w: J. Herbig, R. Hohlfeld (red.), Die zweite Schöpfung. Geist und Ungeist in der Biologie des 20. Jahrhunderds, Hanser, München 1990, s. 44–70.

Odsyłacze do literatury należy umieszczać na jeden ze dwóch sposobów:

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B) w zamieszonej na końcu tekstu Bibliografii. W takim przypadku odsyłacze do literatury powinny być umieszczone w tekście według następującego schematu: nazwisko autora, rok wydania, strony, na przykład: (Giere, 1988, s. 25).

Wybrany przez Autora sposób A) lub B) powinien być stosowany konsekwentnie w całym tekście.

C) Bibliografia winna być uporządkowana alfabetycznie, według nazwisk autorów.

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Teksty nadsyłane do czasopisma są recenzowane zgodnie ze standardami peer‐blind review. Szablon recenzji oraz lista recenzentów każdego wydanego tomu czasopisma jest podana na stronie internetowej czasopisma. Lista recenzentów nie jest stała. Redakcja powołuje recenzentów w zależności od tematyki przysyłanych tekstów. Daje to gwarancję oceniania tekstów przez faktycznych specjalistów problematyki rozważanej w nadsyłanych tekstach.

Peer-review Procedure

Proces recenzowania

Teksty nadsyłane do czasopisma są recenzowane zgodnie ze standardami peer‐blind review. Szablon recenzji oraz lista recenzentów każdego wydanego tomu czasopisma jest podana na stronie internetowej czasopisma. Lista recenzentów nie jest stała. Redakcja powołuje recenzentów w zależności od tematyki przysyłanych tekstów. Daje to gwarancję oceniania tekstów przez faktycznych specjalistów problematyki rozważanej w nadsyłanych tekstach.

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