Neuroscience deals with the issue of moral judgment. That term already has a long history in philosophical reflection. Both fields, the neurosciences and the philosophy, use different methodologies when applying it. The approach of neuroscientists tends to be reductionist. This article seeks to overcome this reductionism. The main question is: How the term “moral judgment” is understood in neurosciences? Is its understanding very different from that which is present in moral philosophy? To answer, in the first part of the article, the author investigates the meaning of the term “moral judgment” in four scientifical models: in the moral intuitionism of experimental psychology, in Social Intuitionist Model by Jonathana Haidt, in Dual-Process Theory by Joshua Green, and finaly, in Somatic Marker Hypothesis by Antonio Damasio. These reflections introduce the second part of which the subject is an examination of Christian moral philosophy and its confrontation with the findings of neuroscientists.