Przegląd Filozoficzny. Nowa Seria

From childhood, Blaise Pascal (1623–1662) was educated in a house where he had contacts with members of the Mersenne Academy. Due to these circumstances he was familiar with the achievements of mathematicians, physicists and other pioneers of the Great Scientific Revolution of 1540–1640. He formulated an important theorem on conic sections, built a mechanical calculator, and together with Pierre de Fermat laid the foundations of the calculus of probability. In physics, he made important research on vacuum and atmospheric pressure. He did not make important theoretical or experimental discoveries in this field, but he played a great historical role because he gave experimental research and theoretical inquiries on these subjects a more systematic form than other physicists of his time. And systematic treatment lies in the nature of science.

The paper is devoted to Blaise Pascal perceived as a mathematician and a philosopher of mathematics. The following of his mathematical achievements have been presented: the theorem on a hexagon inscribed in a conic, his idea of a calculating machine, the arithmetical triangle, his works connected with the probability theory as well as his ideas connected with the infinitesimal calculus. Historical context of his results and their impact are discussed. Also Pascal’s considerations about mathematics as a science have been presented. His main philosophical theses concern methods of mathematics as well as dispersed remarks on the infinity and on types of mathematical thinking are surveyed.

This paper discusses Blaise Pascal’s account of the void and his struggle against the traditional concept of horror vacui (‘fear of the void’). The historical part of the paper relates the story of how Pascal was informed about Evangelista Torricelli’s experiments, how he got interested in the problem of the void and how he conducted his experimental research. Next comes a presentation of Pascal’s dispute with Father Étienne Noël, a Jesuit and Cartesian. Noël’s arguments against the void and Pascal’s counter-arguments in defence of the void are reiterated and discussed. Some reference is made to Pascal’s remarks on the void contained in his later works, such as Les Pensées. The presentation of Pascal’s research on the void is enlarged by some general remarks on his role in the 17^th century scientific revolution.

Blaise Pascal (1623–1662) is undoubtedly a great figure in the history of modern science and a classic of French literature. However, his importance as a philosopher can be disputed. In this domain, he is sometimes accused of being an expressive (i.e. strong) irrationalist. The paper analyzes Pascal’s epistemological and methodo-logical views, both within and outside scientific knowledge. The category of the ‘heart’ is also considered, which (allegedly) is a symptom of irrationalism. In the author’s opinion, the qualification of Pascal as an irrationalist is a significant simplification and an expression not so much of critical thinking as of thinking by using stereotypes.

In the article I analyze the argumentative-interpretative strategy used by Blaise Pascal in Les Pensées as a kind of critical method. He uses this method while presenting various issues, in particular when discussing justice, but also when he problematizes the power of reason itself. This method involves a constant reversal of reasons in the movement from ‘for’ to ‘against’, and in the search for the hidden reason of phenomena-appearances. In this article, I am interested in the paradoxes and ambiguities associated with the use of this method, which I diagnose on several levels, primarily as the effect of employing the ‘unity of opposites’, but also as a manifestation of inconsistency in assessing the possibilities of reason, which in social matters led Pascal to extreme pessimism and cynicism.

In this paper I take up the question announced by the title: which of our cognitive faculties and inclinations lie, according to Pascal, beyond the limits of reason. I focus on these faculties and attempt to determine their value for our cognition, for our attitudes and our way of being in the world. Although, according to Pascal, some elements lying beyond the pale of reason are extremely valuable, while other interfere with cognition or even exert a destructive effect on it, the boundary between the praiseworthy and the deceptive items are sometimes blurred and difficult to decipher. Some contemporary theoretical proposals address this problem by attempting to qualify and evaluate our extra-rational capacities and inclinations in various ways. The text identifies two of these concepts: intuitionism and the dual process theory. Each of them addresses in a different way the problem which Pascal has left unresolved.

By designating to the heart a separate and efficient human cognitive power Blaise Pascal singled out a group of ideas that make his thought an inspiration for philosophical reflection and a subject of lively discussions. However, over 350 years of research on this issue proved less than is needed to develop a uniform interpretation of his position. The article presents some of the most important views on the relationship between the order of the mind and the order of the heart. Through the centuries, an interpretation that attributed irrationality to Pascal was dominant. But in the later time several other opinions were developed side by side with the old one. Today a variety of views is supported. Some scholars emphasize rationality of cognition which they attribute even to the heart. Other stress vacillations of reason. Still other find in Pascal’s thought a belief in the integral operation of all human cognitive faculties. There is little hope that a single, uniform interpretation of Pascal’s philosophy will ever be available.

The paper discusses philosophical problems arising from a philosophical confusion caused by a careless use of the concepts: rhetoric, sophistry, casuistry. Although Pascal had not been personally responsible for creating this confusion, he used these terms as did his contemporaries, which means, he used them erroneously. His reckless manner of expressing his opinions led him to a distorted interpretation of the controversy between the rigorists and the laxists. This confusion was resolved only a few decades ago, in the context of bioethical discussions. The corrected version of the debate throws a new light on the views supported by the Jansenists, Jesuits and Dominicans of the 17^th century.

The aim of this article is to analyze the category of l’esprit de finesse, which in Les Pensées is contrasted with the category of l’esprit de géométrie. The two types of mind distinguished by Pascal are: the intuitive mind, associated with concepts such as finnesse, délicatesse, justesse or sentiment, and the mathematical mind, following the Cartesian method of arguing more geometrico. In the course of this analysis I focus on translation and different ways of distinguishing between both Pascalian types of mind in the Polish, English and German editions. This analysis leads to the conclusion that the description accompanying the presentation of the l’esprit de finesse emphasizes the aesthetic character of the intuitive mind. To support this thesis, I refer to some representatives of the early aesthetics of the 17th and 18th centuries: Nicolas Boileau- -Despréaux, Dominique Bouhours, Lord Shaftesbury, Alexander Baumgarten. At the end of the article the aesthetic nature of l’esprit de finesse is confirmed by referring to the concept of Wolfgang Welsch’s ‘aesthetic thinking’.