TY - JOUR N2 - Abstract We consider a model of fishery management, where n agents exploit a single population with strictly concave continuously differentiable growth function of Verhulst type. If the agent actions are coordinated and directed towards the maximization of the discounted cooperative revenue, then the biomass stabilizes at the level, defined by the well known “golden rule”. We show that for independent myopic harvesting agents such optimal (or ε-optimal) cooperative behavior can be stimulated by the proportional tax, depending on the resource stock, and equal to the marginal value function of the cooperative problem. To implement this taxation scheme we prove that the mentioned value function is strictly concave and continuously differentiable, although the instantaneous individual revenues may be neither concave nor differentiable. L1 - http://www.czasopisma.pan.pl/Content/104467/PDF/acsc-2017-0001.pdf L2 - http://www.czasopisma.pan.pl/Content/104467 PY - 2017 IS - No 1 DO - 10.1515/acsc-2017-0001 A1 - Rokhlin, Dmitry B. A1 - Usov, Anatoly PB - Committee of Automatic Control and Robotics PAS DA - 2017 T1 - Rational taxation in an open access fishery model UR - http://www.czasopisma.pan.pl/dlibra/publication/edition/104467 T2 - Archives of Control Sciences ER -