@ARTICLE{Tarnowski_Maciej_Knowledge_2022,
 author={Tarnowski, Maciej},
 number={No 4},
 journal={Przegląd Filozoficzny. Nowa Seria},
 pages={279-297},
 howpublished={online},
 year={2022},
 publisher={Komitet Nauk Filozoficznych PAN},
 publisher={Wydział Filozofii Uniwersytetu Warszawskiego},
 abstract={In a few short paragraphs of The Problems of Philosophy Bertrand Russell presents his theory of introspective knowledge based on the concept of knowledge by acquaintance. In this article, I critically analyze these comments by Russell and their proposed application by contemporary authors, including Brie Gertler (2001; 2011) and Laurence BonJour (2003). I show how these theories differ from the competing ‘inner‑sense theories’ and try to show that they are inconsistent with Gareth Evans’s ‘transparency’ observation. Then I compare acquaintance theories with Alex Byrne’s (2005; 2012) ‘transparency’ theory and show that Byrne’s theory offers a simpler account of mechanisms governing introspection and attribution of mental states to other agents than the observer.},
 type={Artykuł},
 title={Knowledge by acquaintance and the transparency of introspection},
 URL={http://www.czasopisma.pan.pl/Content/129814/2022-04-PFIL-18.pdf},
 doi={10.24425/pfns.2022.143864},
 keywords={introspection, knowledge by acquaintance, knowledge by description, B. Russell, self‑knowledge, transparency},
}