@ARTICLE{Lisak_Andrzej_Topicality_2020, author={Lisak, Andrzej}, number={No 4}, journal={Przegląd Filozoficzny. Nowa Seria}, pages={191-204}, howpublished={online}, year={2020}, publisher={Komitet Nauk Filozoficznych PAN}, publisher={Wydział Filozofii Uniwersytetu Warszawskiego}, abstract={The article argues that, paradoxically, Roman Ingarden is unable to demonstrate that the world „exists” in any essential sense of the word „existence”, since he assumes (in line with Edmund Husserl) an ego-centered, living-through model of pure consciousness, and thus, again following Husserl, he postulates as the starting point of his considerations the existence of two separate realms of individual objects: the realm of pure consciousness (understood in a Husserlian manner as a stream of experiences) and the realm of objective world. Consciousness is grasped as a set of acts, not contents. However, consciousness (as pointed out in neo-Kantianism by Paul Natorp and in phenomenology by Jean-Paul Sartre) is something primary, in which only later on the world and the real existing subject can be constituted as such; hence consciousness cannot be equated with any subject whatsoever. Consciousness does not constitute anything but is a position from which we can see the constitution itself. Thus conceptualized consciousness does not contain the lived experience of the world but stands closely to the being itself. The fact that we have the living-through experience of the world is only secondarily conjectured by the subject already constituted in the primary consciousness. The failure of Ingarden’s project is caused by his Cartesian assumption regarding the primacy of the empirical conscious subject (a view shared with Husserl), his co-opting of the British- -empiricist model of epistemology, namely the distinction between the ‘sense data’ and ‘intentional grasping of the sensuous data’, in conjunction with something what Hermann Schmitz has called ‘metaphysics of the solid object’. In the aftermath of these considerations those aspects in Ingarden’s philosophy which truly lead toward realism are revealed.}, type={Artykuły / Articles}, title={Topicality of the 'Controversy over the Existence of the World' in the light of then‑contemporary philosophical standpoints}, URL={http://www.czasopisma.pan.pl/Content/118072/PDF/2020-04-PFIL-13-Lisak.pdf}, doi={10.24425/pfns.2020.135070}, keywords={consciousness, E. Husserl, idealism, R. Ingarden, phenomenology, transcendental philosophy, realism}, }