@ARTICLE{Stępnik_Andrzej_The_2019, author={Stępnik, Andrzej}, number={No 4}, journal={Przegląd Filozoficzny. Nowa Seria}, pages={299-316}, howpublished={online}, year={2019}, publisher={Komitet Nauk Filozoficznych PAN}, publisher={Wydział Filozofii Uniwersytetu Warszawskiego}, abstract={The aim of this article is a critical analysis of Peter F. Strawson’s theory of primitiveness of the concept of person contained in the third chapter of the Individuals. The problems associated with the distinction between M-predicates and P-predicates are pointed out. The article shows different ways of understanding primitiveness of the concept of person, and points to gaps in Strawson’s argumentation and to the dubious potential of the theory if it is used to solve some basic problems in philosophy of mind. It also deals with some of the difficulties outlined, but does not propose to solve them all.}, type={Artykuły / Articles}, title={The primitiveness of the concept of person in the philosophy of P.F. Strawson: A critical analysis}, URL={http://www.czasopisma.pan.pl/Content/114352/PDF/P.Filoz.%204-19%2018-A.Stepnik.pdf}, doi={10.24425/pfns.2019.130930}, keywords={P.F. Strawson, person, concept of person, primitiveness of the concept of person}, }