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Abstract

Artykuł przedstawia dokonane przez Donalda Davidsona przezwyciężenie poglądu, jakoby poznanie rzeczywistości było możliwe wyłącznie poprzez odniesienie do danej, przygodnej siatki pojęciowej i w konsekwencji nie mogło nosić miana „obiektywnego”. Davidson atakuje ową tezę, wskazując, że niesie ona ze sobą presupozycję, którą sama wyklucza. Poruszony zostaje również problem przekładu, gdzie Davidson twierdzi, że już rozpoznanie lokalnej nieprzekładalności zakłada znajomość wielu przypadków przekładalności. Sama metafora siatki pojęciowej „porządkującej” lub „organizują170 Wojciech Kozyra cej” pozamentalną rzeczywistość zostaje przez Davidsona odrzucona poprzez wykazanie, że używający jej relatywiści naruszają reguły kierujące poprawnym użyciem owych słów w języku naturalnym. Po zarzuceniu prób ugruntowania obiektywności w dowodzie na istnienie świata Davidson szkicuje swój własny pogląd, zwracając naszą uwagę na sposób, w jaki obiektywność manifestuje się w ludzkim doświadczeniu. Przy tej okazji powołuje się na swoją ideę holizmu mentalnego, oraz nalega na niereistyczne podejście do indywiduacji stanów mentalnych.
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Authors and Affiliations

Wojciech Kozyra
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Abstract

While working on the oeuvre of P.F. Strawson (1919–2006), and especially on his metaphysics, I had a unique opportunity to exchange ideas with this eminent exponent of Oxford philosophy. Those exchanges, of which some have been reflected in private correspondence and in a published reply to one of my papers, were focussed on various interpretative questions. Three threads of those discussions seem especially pertinent for grasping the gist of Strawson’s philosophy and its general orientation. The first one concerned the nature of philosophical analysis, or to be more precise, the connective model of it, favoured by Strawson, and its relationship with the idea of concept presupposition. The second thread had to do with the position taken by the Oxford philosopher in the realism debate on three levels: semantic, epistemological, and metaphysical. Strawson made every effort to take a realist stand in this debate and avoid antirealism in any of its forms; however, his realism is in many respects very moderate and not so distant from antirealism. Similarly moderate was his stand in the traditional debate about universals, constituting the topic of the third thread of the exchanges with Strawson. He claimed that universals exist, but at the same time emphasized that they are objects of pure thought alone and as such do not form a part of the spatiotemporal world in which we live. One cannot also say much about the relation of exemplification in virtue of which universals manifest themselves in the world as particular instances. Presentation and elaboration of these three threads has led to the conclusion that although Strawson was a deeply systematic thinker, he avoided wide-ranging and ambitious statements and radical views. In characteristically minimalist way he dispelled some questions, and the ultimate resolution of many crucial and fundamental issues were for him choice and taking a particular attitude or stance.

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Authors and Affiliations

Tadeusz Szubka
ORCID: ORCID
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Abstract

For Peter F. Strawson, transcendental arguments were an important part of his philosophical method, referred to as a connective analysis. Both Strawson and his critical commentators have devoted a lot of effort to determining the nature, scope and purpose of those arguments. In this text, I intend, first of all, to reconstruct and characterize the basic elements of transcendental argumentation, specifying its general form, features and purpose. Secondly, I reconstruct some of the most representative examples of this argumentation. Thirdly, I refer to the basic objections against transcendental arguments formulated in the literature. Finally, I point to a few peculiarities in those arguments, commonly omitted by commentators and interpreters. The overall message of the paper is moderately positive: transcendental arguments are a legitimate way of reasoning in philosophy, and in particular, they constitute a comprehensible and well-founded part of Strawson’s connective analysis.

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Authors and Affiliations

Mariusz Grygianiec

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