In the frame of the grammatical description “from meaning to form” the author promotes the thesis that arguments implied by verbal predicates stand in the syntactic position primarily designed for noun phrases.

Bierwiaczonek (2013: 201-202) proposed an analysis of the polysemy of the verb see based on propositional metonymic mappings. In Matusz (2020) I supported this claim with a short dictionary analysis. In the present paper, I propose a similar analysis of the polysemy of hear based on propositional metonymy processes. In order to do that a short dictionary analysis is performed to determine the basic non- metonymic meaning of the verb and to distinguish the senses motivated by metonymic mappings. The analysis performed on the basis of three dictionary sources shows that a significant number of senses of hear may plausibly be explained as cases of PART FOR WHOLE propositional metonymic patterns. The metonymic shift may be demonstrated on the basis of State-of-Affairs Scenarios (SASs), as proposed by Panther and Thornburg (1999), due to the fact that within such scenarios the stage of auditory perception constitutes a particularly salient stage (a stage of SAS for SAS). Alternatively, some dictionary samples are ambiguous between the PART FOR WHOLE metonymic interpretation and the metaphoric reading wherein metonymy plays an active role in the emergence of the metaphoric shift. Thus, reference to metonymy-metaphor interaction appears indispensable. In the paper, I propose an analysis of such cases based on Ruiz de Mendoza and Díez Velasco (2002), who consider the role of metonymic domain expansion within the source of the metaphoric mappings.

This paper sets out to characterise and analyse logical atomism of Bertrand Russell. Main tenets of that theory are described by reference to Russell’s lecture Facts and Propositions (1918) and to other publications by that author. The essential claims of Russell’s position are discussed and confronted with tenets of ontology of situations developed by Bogusław Wolniewicz, a position inspired by logical atomism of Ludwig Wittgenstein. The author argues that several of Russell’s theses on logical atomism can be interpreted in the light of Wolniewicz’s ontology of situations. Finally, some minor concluding remarks are offered that can help to develop an ontology conceived in the spirit of the ontology of logical atomism. 366 Janusz Kaczmarek

In his 1903 monograph Principles of Mathematics Bertrand Russell formulated a theory which interpreted a proposition expressed by a sentence as a unitary bond of referents (meanings) of its parts. In the paper I argue that the problem he faced in his attempt to define the unity of proposition is a special case of a wider philosophical problem of the relation between language and the world. Mentioned for the first time by Plato in Parmenides and then repeated by Aristotle in Metaphysics, infinite regress formulated as ʻthe third man argument’ presented a problem for Francis Bradley, Bertrand Russell and Gottlob Frege. It was reformulated in syntactic terms by Hans Reichenbach and used by Donald Davidson as an argument against referential semantics. The conclusion of the paper is as follows: ʻthe third man argument’ is a result of projecting syntactic structures of language on metaphysically conceived referential semantics. It does not undermine ontology conceived as an investigation of possible beings.