The paper demonstrates a close relationship of post-truth to pragmatic truth as William James put it. As such post-truth cannot be treated—as it is commonly perceived— as a falsehood in the sense given it by the classical idea of truth. Post-truth is not a classical cognitive value, but a means of action, more concretely, a means of realizing interests of its operator by using the method of cognitive camouflage; it means that post-truth is disguised as a truth in its classical (correspondence) sense, but it only seemingly communicates in the objective way (i.e., impartially and nonsubjectively) real facts. In my view, the present eruption of post-truths is an effect of the spreading of the pragmatic system of values and infecting by it the whole public sphere and, in consequence, also individual principles and norms of action.

O znaczeniu prawdy, roli fikcji i skutkach życia w kulturze nadmiaru oraz o kryzysie demokracji mówi prof. dr hab. Stanisław Filipowicz, wiceprezes Polskiej Akademii Nauk.

Edith Stein is a person who was born in the Jewish traditionally religious family. In her youth she lost her faith in God. However in her life she was seeking the truth. In this search she was very honest. The article first shows different definitions of truth. Then he takes the presentation of Edith Stein’s, the ways of phenomenological discov-ery of the truth about a human person. Finally, it shows her coming to the discovery of the God of Love, who has drawn her to mystical union in the spirituality of Carmel. Edith Stein died in the concentration camp in Auschwitz, experiencing the mystery of the Cross of Christ and sacrificing herself for her people.

This article examines some aspects of a broader theme indicated in the title with respect to the diptych Tyrtaeus: A Tragedy and Behind the Scenes: A Fantastic Tale. While the present analysis is based on the fi ndings of earlier critics, it develops various parallels suggested by the use of musical motifs in Norwid’s twin dramas. Those associations act as an aid to a better understanding of the differences between the attitudes and ideas presented in the plays. Moreover, by indirectly marking the contrasts of truth and falsehood, they hold the key to the moral interpretation of the plays. The overall pattern of the musical references and associations in Tyrtaeus and Behind the Scenes appears to refl ect Norwid’s organic philosophy and his idea of creative originality. Finally, the purported pushing of Tyrtaeus off a cliff, an episode symbolizing the rejection of the right path, is analyzed along two similar poetic images of Norwid’s, Aesop’s fall into an abyss (On Freedom of Speech) and the hurling of Chopin’s piano out of the window (‘Chopin’s Piano’).

The goal of this article is to show the interdependence of the reception of Don Quixote and the concept of identity. The argument is founded on the rejection of Don Quixote perceived as an invented character from the world of fiction and treating him instead as a Cartesian subject, in possession of the cogito faculty and defined by the truth. The Cartesian project, though, comes under pressure when the cogito constitutes itself by telling a story about itself. Cartesianism, a philosophy of consciousness, contains an embryo of a new reflection about subjectivity. With the new approach comes a positive reappraisal of the figure of Don Quixote and an acknowledgement of the key role of fiction in the process of becoming human. The liberation of identity from the tyranny of substantialism and the foundation of the subject on action has paved the way for treating the goals of action as originals produced by the subject rather than copies or reproductions.

The article presents the main functions of aesthetic values (beauty, simplicity, symmetry) in the process of formulating, evaluating and accepting scientific theories in the work of physicist: 1) they motivate to undertake scientific research; (2) have a heuristic role which enables the direction of the search for a new theory to be selected; (3) are a criterion for choosing between empirically equivalent theories in the absence of empirical evidences and (4) sometimes constitute an epistemological obstacle. The basic thesis of the work is that aesthetic values, in addition to positive functions, also play a negative role in science, hindering the acceptance of new theories or leading to inefficient research. Too much weight on the aesthetic side of theory can pose a threat to the objectivity of scientific cognition.

In this paper I present Bertrand Russell’s contacts with Polish readers and outstanding Polish writers. In paragraphs 2 and 3 I discuss books by Russell that were published in Poland and mention his personal contacts and correspondence. Russell exchanged letters with L. Chwistek, J. Conrad‑Korzeniowski, M. Dziewicki, G. Herling-‑Grudziński, S. Leśniewski, W. Lutosławski and A. Tarski. Interesting comments on his philosophy were offered by M. Ossowska, K. Twardowski, J. Salamucha and M. Heitzman. Paragraphs 4 and 5 discuss the influence that Russell’s logical ideas have exerted on the development of logic in Poland, especially in the works of L. Chwistek and S. Leśniewski.

The article describes the Roman Catholic understanding of the ecumenical dialogue as stated in the Decree on ecumenism of the Second Vatican Council and in further documents of the RC Church. This ecumenical dialogue may be conducted only among Christian Churches and Church Communities as it aims the restoration of full visible unity of Christians.

The dialogue should primarily lead to the common rediscovery of the truth, and never to any kind of establishing the truth, of elaborating it or reaching the compromise. The true dialogue has nothing to do with negotiating the common position, where each party wants to force oneself upon another and to make the less concessions possible. This is because we cannot reduce the requirements of the Gospel to any kind of necessary minimum, a common basis recognized by all the churches and ecclesial communities.

Such a dialogue contains its inner dynamics, its existential dimension. The truth is personal, as Christ himself is the Truth, so the search for unity belongs to the proper essence of being a Christian. So the ecumenical dialogue is “an imperative of Christian conscience” (John Paul II), so it is something that inevitably ought to be taken and accomplished by Christians.

The ecumenical dialogue however is not the goal for itself. Neither it is only mutual recognition of Christian Communities or even common prayer. The common aimis the restoration of full visible unity of divided Churches. On the way of ecumenism we cannot limit to the prayer or the ecumenical dialogue. On the contrary – we should develop all the possible ways of collaboration, because unity of action leads to the full unity of faith. Neither the unity nor uniformity of doctrine or churchly traditions, but only the unity in one faith is the far-reaching goal of the ecumenical dialogue.

The documents of the RC Church give also clear hints how to lead the ecumenical dialogues: the dialoguing parties must be expert in theology, seeking the truth, not a victory, moving from easier topics to the more diffcult ones, trying to use the language free of polemical connotations.

Before the Second Vatican Council the Catholic Church didn’t lead any offcial ecumenical dialogue, what didn’t mean the lack of any ecumenical encounters. The first ones, however, were unoffcial and did not engage the offcial Church authority. Widespread engagement in the ecumenical dialogues in the time of popes Paul VI and John Paul II can be justly perceived as a direct fruit of the Second Vatican council and its Decree on ecumenism.

During the decades the commissions of dialogue have already elaborated thousands of pages of common statements and agreed declarations. The Churches must be however aware, that without strong effort of reception of these documents in their midst, the fruits of the dialogues will have no infuence on the reconciliation of Christians in one faith.

Even if there may be some kind of deception because of slowness of ecumenical process, we can be certain that meetings in the dialogue enabled Christians of various Churches an Church Communities to grow towards full, visible unity wanted by our Lord for His disciples.

The article aims to analyse the context in which the phrase “historical truth” is present in the Polish public discourse regarding recent history. The author intends to show the ways and aims of the usage of historical truth in the competition to obtain and maintain power. Referring to the assumptions of the Web 2.0. paradigm, in the conclusion the author puts forward the thesis that the historical truths present in the public sphere do not only attempt to answer social expectations of what historical truth Poles need but they are also co-created by potential recipients.

The question about theology is, indeed, the question about the cognitive role of faith, a mutual relationship between faith and mind, as well as cultural, social and existential consequences of accepting or eliminating faith in the cognitive (scientific) process. While developing in the space of thought, theology seeks rational arguments speaking in favour of God’s answers to existential questions. In his publications and teachings J. Ratzinger/Benedict XVI gives much attention to these issues, as they are particularly topical and important for the contemporary civilisation. He teaches that faith releases the mind (makes it independent, non-ideologized), opens it to the truth, the learning of which constitutes the key objective of all scientific research. Recogni-tion of the priority of gifts, God’s grace, who makes Himself known through his Word and actions is an important pre-requisite for theological cognition. Ultimately, it has a christological sense: Son knows His Father and wants to reveal the Mystery of God. As scientia fidei, theology has got potential to give relational and holistic character to cognitive actions, thus made them acquire sense transcending their temporary use-fulness. Theology, faithful to the Church, contributes to the development of the world and men in the deepest meaning of the word – it leads to salvation, finding fulfilment in God Himself.

Benedict XVI, as the Supreme Shepherd of the Church and the head of the Vatican state (Vatican City), maintained contacts with representatives of the authorities of Muslim countries or those dominated by Islamic culture. He supported and built good relations between representatives of different religions, including Islam, through openness and honesty in the interreligious dialogue and bearing witness to the essential values of Christianity and Islam – justice and peace. In the article, we indicated the essence, purpose and challenges of interreligious dialogue, especially dialogue with Islam. People and environments involved in its conduct should be guided by the idea of searching for the true good of man and society. At the same time, it is important to remain faithful to one’s own religious identity, especially on the doctrinal level. Dialogue, in fact, should aim, first of all, at seeking the truth and bearing witness to it. This will only be possible if you respect your own faith and show respect for the identity of the followers of Islam. In the dialogue with Islam, the most important is Almighty God, who must be given his rightful place. For faith in one God obliges His believers to be responsible for peace. Benedict XVI’s theory of dialogue found confirmation in the papal meetings, either with the “world of Islam” or with various bodies (ecclesiastical, political, people involved in the so-called dialogue of specialists). For Benedict XVI, the most important criterion for dialogue was fidelity to Christian identity.

In this paper, I present a short 10-point characteristics of the classical conception of truth. Subsequently I point to the importance and comprehensive usefulness of this truth, among others, to the possibility of applying it in some virtual environments, e.g., in those which include virtual objects of types A and C. I also emphasize that—independently of views of promotors and creators of the “post-truth era” (e.g. the will of politicians, propagandists and the authors of conspiracy theories)—truth as it is grasped in the classical theory is in principle non-withdrawable from social discourse, including its philosophical and scientific fields.

The main goal of this article is to characterise and compare some aspects of Hilary Putnam’s referential theory of meaning and Robert B. Brandom’s inferential theory of meaning. I will do it to indicate some similarities and differences in these theories. It will provide an opportunity for a deeper understanding of these theories and for a more adequate evaluation of how they describe and explain the process of meaning acquisition of linguistic expressions.

In his theory of meaning Putnam emphasises the importance of reference understood as a relationship which connects linguistic expressions and extra-linguistic (empirical) reality. Brandom acknowledges inference as a main category useful in characterising the meaning of expressions used in premises and a conclusion of inference. But his theory of meaning is criticised for minimalising the role of an empirical component (demonstratives etc.). He tries to defend his standpoint in the anaphoric theory of reference.

Putnam like Brandom claimed that we – as cognitive subjects – are not in a situation in which we learn about the extra-linguistic reality in a direct way. It is the reality itself as well as our cognitive apparatus that play a role in a cognitive process.

This article presents the problem of understanding Heideggerian ‘turn’ (Kehre) in the context of the most important aspects of his later philosophy. Since Heidegger had written (secretly) Contributions to Philosophy, he departed from his original philosophical assumptions, which had been presented in Being and Time. Heidegger’s turn was conceived as a discovery of truth of Being, as a project of another beginning, as proper asking about Being as such, as well as a discovery of a hidden aspect of being that is revealed in an event (‘enowning’).

University and the Church need each other. Following the example of Christ incarnated, Christianity “incarnates” the spiritual. The Church and theology need university and cooperation with other sciences to be able to “incarnate” Christ’s issue into our world. Th e university, on the other hand, needs the Church and theology because otherwise it would be deprived of cultural and spiritual foundation: there is no alternative to a discussion about Christ (God and a human). Theology is sometimes defined as scientia fidei; it is determined by the mind and faith. It’s a discussion about God, but due to the Christ event it is also a discussion about mankind. Th erefore it has the form of a dialogue, a discussion. The dialogue is always held in a specific context (nowadays postmodern), in which theology not only has to ask but also answer the question about the meaning. In this sense it is wisdom. Theology as a discussion has to approach the most urgent human problems. These include agnosticism towards which Benedict XVI suggests the “veluti si Deus daretur” rule, relativism in case of which theology cannot stop asking about truth, despair in case of which theology reminds about God, in whom there is no darkness.

Joseph Ratzinger binds together the triptych “theology – the university – science” by the common issue of a search for the truth and the service to the truth. Theology is being done “in the Church and with the Church”, it belongs to the Church and depends upon her. Thus, theology is ecclesial in its essence, it teaches not in its own name but on behalf of the Church.

The ethos of the university – particularly of a Catholic university – consists in the common witness to the truth and in forming the transcendent dimension of man. Thus, the service to the human person is expressed by the university in developing “a new humanism” as a response to cultural and spiritual desires of the humankind. The mission of the university is not only its service to knowledge but also to the education, which means bearing witness to the truth that has been found.

According to Benedict XVI both theology and the university with science should know how to unite the two ways of knowing – faith and reason into one common tone, with its unique enhancing of reason. In a characteristic way Ratzinger gives special attention to rationality which leads to the ultimate Truth.

According to Kurt Gödel, Bertrand Russell misinterpreted the incompleteness theorem, but did it in ʻa very interesting manner’. To understand what he meant we need to consider their attitudes to defining truth. Even more revealing is the discussion of two fundamental approaches to logic: one is universalistic, and assumed by both Russell and Gödel, and the other is model‑theoretical, Alfred Tarski’s style. It turns out that a misleading or erroneous interpretation can be interesting, as it reveals something fundamental. William Byers claims that truly great ideas in mathematics and about mathematics are in a way false, as they lead to errors, but at the same time they can help to make advances in math. Logicism provides a good example. In addition it may be mentioned that when Russell argued in its favor, he committed a logical fallacy.