Weak mysterianism defines the situation in philosophy of mind in which we can neither formulate a solvable problem of consciousness nor prove that it is unsolvable. To develop the issue the author starts with a description of the theories and concepts described as mysterious. General mysterianism is a position in the philosophy of mind, according to which we are admittedly able to indicate scientific issues but cannot formulate them as scientific problems and thus solve them. These issues are called ‘mysteries’ by Noam Chomsky. The article presents several argumentation strategies typical for mysterian theories – evolutionary closure, autonomy of consciousness, and methodological mysterianism of William Seager. Each is subject to criticism, which shows that the mysterian argumentation is non-conclusive. It turns out, therefore, that the problem of mysteriousness is that indicating the possibility of mysteries in science does not entail a proof that we are dealing with specific mysteries (first and foremost the mystery of the mind).

P.F. Strawson and J.L. Austin approach the problem of other minds from different perspectives. Peter Strawson looks at this problem from the perspective of descriptive metaphysics, which largely disregards the concrete situations in which we use mental language. John Austin, on the other hand, believes that to understand what is happening in such situations holds the key to solving the former problem. However, as it turns out, the considerations of both authors in the key fragments rely on similar observations. In addition, Austin’s perspective, which looks at the language from the point of view of its usage, makes it possible to formulate an answer to the Strawson’s critics. This does not exclude the possibility of agreeing with Strawson on the primacy of the reference function of language, if we understand it properly. Ultimately, Strawson and Austin’s approaches do not compete, but complement each other.