The aim of this paper is to present and explain the metaethical theory proposed by Ayn Rand. In particular, Rand’s view of ethics as necessary for human life is discussed. I also analyze the concept of value which is crucial to Rand’s ethics. I seek to demonstrate that the concept of value is rooted in the concept of life, and from this it follows that the normative sphere is secondary to the existence of living beings. Further, I introduce Rand’s argument concerning human life as an ultimate point of reference in her philosophy. Finally, I explain the conditional character of morality, and end my paper with a short discussion of Rand’s unique view on objectivity of values.

The author tries to explain what consequences for social morality ensue from the assumption that moral attitudes are expressed not only in words but also in reactive attitudes. P.F. Strawson assumes that acts of resentment can alter attitudes of those who have triggered them by their behavior. On the other hand, we are ready to control our outbursts of short temper and anger to a certain degree if we take into account agents’ motives and their limited ability to exercise self-control. Moreover, it seems that reactive attitudes – though less precise than verbal rebuke – are more frank and straightforward. Nevertheless, why must I, when I hear a mediocre academic researcher brag over and over again about his apparently essential contribution to philosophy, curb my moral assessment of his self-importance to the level of my irritation? Why should I feel constrained to keep my moral disgust in tune with my impatience mixed with amusement? Why shouldn’t I continue to believe that I can be an amiable character and a rigorous moral person at the same time?

In this paper, I present a short 10-point characteristics of the classical conception of truth. Subsequently I point to the importance and comprehensive usefulness of this truth, among others, to the possibility of applying it in some virtual environments, e.g., in those which include virtual objects of types A and C. I also emphasize that—independently of views of promotors and creators of the “post-truth era” (e.g. the will of politicians, propagandists and the authors of conspiracy theories)—truth as it is grasped in the classical theory is in principle non-withdrawable from social discourse, including its philosophical and scientific fields.