Founding myths constitute the substrate of national identities and political orders. Especially in times of political change, the significance of such myths becomes clear as conflicts develop around them, in which various political forces attempt to embed the power of interpretation of a founding event in their programmes. In Poland, this is clearly demonstrated by the continuing polarizing power of political camps around the founding myths of the Third Polish Republic: „Solidarność“ and the Round Table. For that reason, they attempt to personify them to a high degree in the person of Lech Wałęsa. As a representative example, his behaviour serves as a reference for the legitimation of the political programme of the struggling political forces. By using both, the narrative of traitor and hero as sources of reference, political action is justified because of the denial or recognition of the founding myths. The only unifying dogma is once again anticommunism.

The article analyses the results of mass survey conducted in the framework of the project of the Volkswagen Foundation “Bi- and multilingualism between intensification of conflict and conflict resolution. Ethno-linguistic conflicts, language politics and contact situations in post-Soviet Ukraine and Russia”. Research’s aim was to understand to what extent the state language policy in the area of mass media and cultural sphere meet the expectations of the citizens of Ukraine. It underlines regionally marked attitude towards the strategy of language policy: the Western part of the country prefers Ukrainian language, South – Russian, and Center and North take intermediate positions.

The article is devoted to the study of verbal identifiers of the enemy, their ranking in terms of normativity / abnormality of public communication is shown, and distinguished are stylistically neutral and stylistically colored language units. Described are the secondary nominations with negative connotations, as well as determining their communicative and pragmatic load. Achieving the goal was facilitated by the use of a descriptive method, methods of observation, contextual‑semantic and complex analysis. The corpus of the research material were national Ukrainian and regional mass media texts from 2022 to the beginning of 2023. It was found that during the specified time period, the linguistic identifiers of the invaders, which do not violate the canons of written forms of newspaper journalism, were activated. The secondary nominations are aimed at the expressiveness of language expression, the expression of contempt and hatred for one’s enemies and the creation of a specific communicative and pragmatic effect, which, although deaestheticizing the journalistic space, does reorganize the established media space, clearly reflecting the social perception of Ukrainians to the realities of the Russian‑Ukrainian war. The linguistic creativity of Ukrainian journalists expresses a combination of pathos and irony, usually employed to humiliate the Russian enemy.

This article tries to bring more clarity to the issue of media control by the Polish communist party, and in particu-lar identify the institutions, political bodies and politicians who exercised various degrees of control over the press, radio and television in the first half of the 1970. An analysis of various kinds of records and data indi-cates that the day-to-day business of setting the party line for the media was in the hands of propaganda de-partments at the level of the Central Committee. In 1972 they were merged into a single Department of Propa-‑ganda, Press and Publications, headed by Jerzy Łukaszewicz, member of the CC Secretariat, and overseen by Jan Szydlak, member of the Poliburo.