Artykuł jest próbą interpretacji stanowiska Platona w sporze między naturalizmem i konwencjonalizmem w sprawie języka na podstawie dialogu Kratylos. Interpretacja tego dialogu jest nadal przedmiotem sporów we współczesnej literaturze. W artykule przedstawiam następującą interpretację Kratylosa: 1) Platon nie stara się wybrać jednego tylko stanowiska, ale łączy ze sobą naturalizm i konwencjonalizm; 2) specyfika jego tezy na temat języka polega na tym, że według niego konwencjonalizm opisuje faktyczny sposób funkcjonowania języka, zaś naturalizm jest pewnym postulatem dotyczącym tego, jak język powinien funkcjonować. Sformułowanie tego postulatu powinniśmy łączyćz religijnym wymiarem myśli Platona.

In the paper I present the famous argument between Peter F. Strawson and Bertrand Russell on definite descriptions. I do not go into details of the two rival solutions to the problem of definite descriptions. Instead I present the controversy against the background of two traditions within analytic philosophy, i.e. the philosophy of natural language (Strawson) and the philosophy of ideal language (Russell). In consequence, the aim of this paper is to sketch the principal features of the two traditions and to indicate their influence on the argument. In the first paragraph I discuss Russell’s theory of descriptions and present it as a result of dramatic changes that he had made in his philosophy before he finally presented them in On Denoting in 1905. The second paragraph deals with the two traditions within analytic philosophy after the linguistic turn and underlines the role of Strawson in the philosophy of natural language. In the third paragraph I analyze in detail Strawson’s arguments against the theory of descriptions and I focus on some details that are usually omitted in standard presentations. The fourth paragraph discusses Russell’s response to Strawson’s objections, i.e. the counter-arguments formulated from the standpoint of philosophy of ideal language. I end with some suggestions about how to reconcile both approaches.

P.F. Strawson and J.L. Austin approach the problem of other minds from different perspectives. Peter Strawson looks at this problem from the perspective of descriptive metaphysics, which largely disregards the concrete situations in which we use mental language. John Austin, on the other hand, believes that to understand what is happening in such situations holds the key to solving the former problem. However, as it turns out, the considerations of both authors in the key fragments rely on similar observations. In addition, Austin’s perspective, which looks at the language from the point of view of its usage, makes it possible to formulate an answer to the Strawson’s critics. This does not exclude the possibility of agreeing with Strawson on the primacy of the reference function of language, if we understand it properly. Ultimately, Strawson and Austin’s approaches do not compete, but complement each other.