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The problem of envy in the context of principles of justice and Rawls’s construction of the original position

Adrian Kuźniar
Przegląd Filozoficzny. Nowa Seria | 2021 | No 4 | 259-273 | DOI: 10.24425/pfns.2021.138986
Keywords difference principle egalitarianism envy J. Rawls self‑respect theory of justice
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Abstract

The paper analyses and develops John Rawls’s defence of his theory of justice against the conservative objection that egalitarian conceptions of social justice are an expression of envy. The defence involves the following claims: (1) The content of the difference principle does not match an essential property of envy. (2) The parties in the original position are not motivated by envy. (3) None of the conditions imposed on the original position arise from envy. Next, it is argued that there are reasons to suppose that the parties in the original position would choose a more egalitarian principle of distributive justice than the difference principle. These reasons are grounded in the claim that self respect is the most important primary good and in the fact that the level of economic inequalities is negatively correlated with self respect among the least advantaged members of society. It is shown that even though the content of the more egalitarian principle matches the essential property of envy, the conservative objection remains unjustified.
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Bibliography

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Authors and Affiliations

Adrian Kuźniar

On desert‑attribution

Adam Grobler
Przegląd Filozoficzny. Nowa Seria | 2021 | No 4 | 195-206 | DOI: 10.24425/pfns.2021.138981
Keywords desert desertism difference principle distributive and retributive justice J. Rawls self/person
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Abstract

In the paper John Rawls’s account of desert that serves as a premise of the difference principle is questioned. According to Rawls no merits can be located in the self because they arise from random genetic and social factors. Consequently, an individual does not deserve any appreciation for the virtues that can be attributed to them. Against this view I argue, in the first place, that the asymmetry between distributive and retributive justice, as it is professed by Rawls, is not tenable. Next, I question Rawls’s radical separation of the self from its attributes. I argue that random factors are not the only source of the attributes of the self. A person, regardless of her endowment, is able intentionally to develop new meritorious qualities and even transform her character and thereby earn personal deserts. The latter, however, cannot be credited to the individual alone, for they arise from shared aspirations and communal social transactions. In conclusion a reconciliation between the difference principle and a version of desertism is proffered.
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Bibliography

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Authors and Affiliations

Adam Grobler
1
ORCID: ORCID
  1. prof. em., Uniwersytet Opolski, Katedra Filozofii, ul. Katowicka 48, 45‑052 Opole

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