Post-Quantum Cryptography (PQC) attempts to find cryptographic protocols resistant to attacks by means of for instance Shor's polynomial time algorithm for numerical field problems like integer factorization (IFP) or the discrete logarithm (DLP). Other aspects are the backdoors discovered in deterministic random generators or recent advances in solving some instances of DLP. The use of alternative algebraic structures like non-commutative or non-associative partial groupoids, magmas, monoids, semigroups, quasigroups or groups, are valid choices for these new kinds of protocols. In this paper, we focus in an asymmetric cipher based on a generalized ElGamal non-arbitrated protocol using a non-commutative general linear group. The developed protocol forces a hard subgroup membership search problem into a non-commutative structure. The protocol involves at first a generalized Diffie-Hellman key interchange and further on the private and public parameters are recursively updated each time a new cipher session is launched. Security is based on a hard variation of the Generalized Symmetric Decomposition Problem (GSDP). Working with GF(2518) a 64-bits security is achieved, and if GF(25116) is chosen, the security rises to 127-bits. An appealing feature is that there is no need for big number libraries as all arithmetic if performed in Z251 and therefore the new protocol is particularly useful for computational platforms with very limited capabilities like smartphones or smartcards.
Currently, the Republic of Kazakhstan is developing a new standard for symmetric data encryption. One of the candidates for the role of the standard is the Qamal encryption algorithm developed by the Institute of Information and Computer Technologies (Almaty, Republic of Kazakhstan). The article describes the algorithm. Differential properties of the main operations that make up the Qamal cypher are considered in the questions of stability. We have shown that for a version with a 128-bit data block and the same secret key size for three rounds of encryption it is difficult to find the right pairs of texts with a probability of 2–120, which makes differential cryptanalysis not applicable to the Qamal cypher.
Many researchers have contributed to creating Quantum Key Distribution (QKD) since the first protocol BB84 was proposed in 1984. One of the crucial problems in QKD is to guarantee its security with finite-key lengths by Privacy Amplification (PA). However, finite-key analyses show a trade-off between the security of BB84 and the secure key rates. This study analyses two examples to show concrete trade-offs. Furthermore, even though the QKD keys have been perceived to be arbitrarily secure, this study shows a fundamental limitation in the security of the keys by connecting Leftover Hash Lemma and Guessing Secrecy on the QKD keys.
We address one of the weaknesses of the RSA ciphering systems i.e. the existence of the private keys that are relatively easy to compromise by the attacker. The problem can be mitigated by the Internet services providers, but it requires some computational effort. We propose the proof of concept of the GPGPU-accelerated system that can help detect and eliminate users’ weak keys. We have proposed the algorithms and developed the GPU-optimised program code that is now publicly available and substantially outperforms the tested CPU processor. The source code of the OpenSSL library was adapted for GPGPU, and the resulting code can perform both on the GPU and CPU processors. Additionally, we present the solution how to map a triangular grid into the GPU rectangular grid – the basic dilemma in many problems that concern pair-wise analysis for the set of elements. Also, the comparison of two data caching methods on GPGPU leads to the interesting general conclusions. We present the results of the experiments of the performance analysis of the selected algorithms for the various RSA key length, configurations of GPU grid, and size of the tested key set.