The aim of the study was to examine identity statuses in various life domains and the relationship between identity and well-being. We adopted the three-dimensional model of identity (Crocetti et al., 2008), including: in-depth exploration, commitment, and reconsideration of commitment. Moreover, in accordance with domain-specific approach (Goossens, 2001), we sought to empirically derive identity statuses in various life domains. The participants included 835 emerging adults (Mage = 21.81, SD = 2.33). We examined eight domains previously identified in qualitative research: personality characteristics, past experiences, family, friends and acquaintances, worldview, hobbies and interests, aims and plans for the future, and occupation. To measure three identity processes, we used a modified version of the Utrecht-Management of Identity Commitments Scale (Crocetti et al., 2008) and to measure well-being we used the Mental Health Continuum-Short Form (Keyes, 2013). Results indicate that, although the statuses identified in previous research were, to a large extent, replicated (except moratorium), people were classified in different statuses in different domains; thus, we conclude that talking about statuses should be limited to a given domain. Well-being was the highest in achievement statuses and the lowest in diffusion, but only in two examined domains: personality characteristics and past experience.
Although cohabitation is increasingly common in Poland, it is usually considered a transitional, testing stage that leads to marriage, which constitutes the preferred form of family life in the country. Does it mean that couples who do not choose to marry are perceived as somewhat “worse” than those tying the knot? Using qualitative data from focus group interviews with 69 men and women aged 25–40, I aimed to answer the following questions: What are social perceptions of couples who have already “tested” their relationship, but still live together and refrain from marriage? In particular, what are the motives attributed to such couples and how – if at all – these motives are linked to the quality of the relationships? There were four themes related to such motives identified in the analysed material: (1) the perception of marriage as an unnecessary expense that does not change anything in a relationship, or even makes things worse; (2) fear of an ultimate commitment; (3) uncertainty whether this is the right partner and the resulting low level of commitment in the relationship; (4) rejection of traditional gender roles. Commitment appears central in the analysed discussions suggesting that this concept should constitute an important topic in future studies on unions in Poland.
This research provides a tool to select and prioritize new comers to work based on their preentry organizational commitment propensity through examining links between the big five personality factors: extroversion, agreeableness, conscientiousness, neuroticism, openness; and three component model of organizational commitment: affective commitment, continues commitment, normative commitment. Findings show that extroversion and openness respectively have positive and negative effects on all three components of organizational commitment. Results gained by Structured Equation Modelling (SEM) indicate neuroticism is negatively related to affective and continues commitment and positively to conscientiousness effects on continues commitment. In the second part of the study, the received results are applied to extract the general equations that enables to estimate new comer’s pre-entry organizational commitment and to rank them using TOPSIS and AHP. The AHP is used to determine the relative weights of commitment criteria and TOPSIS is employed for the final ranking of new comers based on these criteria’s.
The ethics of ‘theistic absolute morality’ (TAM), as any other ethical theory, must offer a definition of good, describe the connection between good and duty, and provide an effective guidance to human conduct. In the ethics of TAM we find, in my rendering of its claims, an irremediably unsuccessful definition of good, permanently loose connection between moral value and moral duty, and irreparably limited practical efficacy. It is not surprising that it has to be so, as it is a common condition of all ethical systems. The TAM ethics suffers, however, additionally from a unique conceptual trouble, but that is a story I have told elsewhere.