The article is devoted above all to the analysis of the concept of conscience in relation to the space of public life (institutional, professional). The author of the article devotes a special place to the concept of conscience in interpretation of Jürgen Habermas and his ethics of discourse. In the first part of the article, the author points to the change it has made in the modern and contemporary sense of conscience in comparison with classical interpretations. Earlier, the power of conscience was associated with the intellect, whereas today’s conscience is associated with emotions, especially with the ability to empathize, especially the subject’s ability to empathize. Some emotions are cognitive and are related to contextual knowledge. In the second part, the author analyses the concept of the development of moral consciousness of Jürgen Habermas. This concept is based on a philosophical interpretation of the conclusions of the psychologist Lawrence Kohlberg’s experiment. In conclusion, the author writes about of the presence of the “voice” of conscience in the space of public life. Defending the value of discourse on the principles of social life, it can be based on the postulate of Habermas, or the dialogue of people with sensitive consciences.

This article discusses Benedict the XVI’s charting of the formation and history of Europe around a mission to reign as a sacred duty for the sake of Human Dignity in the light of Edith Stein’s insights into the relationship between community formation and objective values. First, an account of Ratzinger’s understanding of Europe as a concept of political geography is given. Secondly is discussed the mission at the heart of the formation of Europe according to Ratzinger, and how such a mission would, according to Stein, be particularly suited for shaping a people and a continent. The third section discusses Ratzinger’s understanding of Human Dignity in the light of Stein’s understanding of values.

The conflict between modernism and post-modernism is one of the defining philosophical debates of the latter half of the 20th century. Proponents of modernism, striving to uphold the banner of the Enlightenment, have sought to undermine dogmatism while maintaining the tenability of certain inviolable principles. Proponents of post-modernism, similarly seeking to advance emancipation, have seen “principles” as inherently antithetical to the achievement of the professed goals of the Enlightenment. In Habermas and Derrida – prime speakers of these respective camps – this debate reached a crescendo. Yet, in both of them, we see that the respective positions of modernism and post-modernism are essentially systemically incommensurable, whereby the position of each side is undermined – in the view of the other side – by its own stance.

Jürgen Habermas’ theory of the public sphere has provoked a massive reaction in European historiography in the last thirty years. However, methodological debates driven by the new questions that it inspired in Germany, England, or France had no equivalent in Poland and more broadly in Eastern Europe. This essay suggests why this might have been the case and argues for the deeper engagement of Polish historians with the Habermasian theory. In the text, I reintro-duce the aims of the theory of the public sphere and look for the possible roots of its lacklustre reception among Polish historians in the idea about the Polish case’s supposed incompatibility with the course of modern history assumed by Habermas. I argue against this view, emphasising the flexibility and open‑endedness of the main Habermasian concepts, as well as underlining the necessity for a specifically Polish answer to Habermas’ theoretical enterprise. In the final part, I present the opportunities brought by adapting the theory to the Polish case, claiming that the original history of the Polish public sphere could be a prospective topic for both Polish historians and other historians of the public sphere.