As it is well known, Peter F. Strawson in the introduction to his book Individuals. An Essay in Descriptive Metaphysics makes a famous distinction between two types of metaphysics: revisionist and descriptive. Descriptive metaphysics is defined there as a kind of philosophical reflection that “describes the actual structure of our thinking about the world”. Another formula used by Strawson is that descriptive metaphysics “reveals the most general features of our conceptual framework”. In the same text Strawson mentions Aristotle as one of the most important representatives of descriptive metaphysics. However, the question may be asked, whether the formulas used by Strawson adequately describe the actual conception of metaphysics in Aristotle. After all, the aim of Aristotle’s inquiry was to reveal the structure of real beings and to find the causes that are at work in reality, and not only to study our concepts with which we describe the world. In my paper I discuss different ways in which Aristotle’s metaphysical project might be understood and I try to determine to what extent it can be associated with descriptive metaphysics in the sense defined by Strawson. In particular, I inquire to what extent Aristotle uses in his metaphysics the methods proposed in his theory of dialectic, whose aim was to help in the study commonly accepted concepts and beliefs (endoxa).

Dziedzictwo Arystotelesa stanowi istotny punkt w historii refleksji nad statusem embrionu ludzkiego. Wypr acowana przez Stagirytę koncepcja rozwoju prenatalnego człowieka wyznaczyła horyzonty myślowe nie tylko w dziedzinie filozofii, ale także medycyny. Arystotelesowskie tezy z zakresu antropologii były również fundamentem dla refleksji nad oceną moralno-prawną przerywania ciąży. Celem analiz jest zrekonstruowanie statusu embrionu ludzkiego według Arystotelesa w oparciu o trzy fundamentalne zagadnienia: natury embrionu ludzkiego, jego animacji oraz natury duszy. Podjęta zostaje również próba wykazania zależności między tymi zagadnieniami. Przesłanki empiryczne stanowią bazę wyjściową dla analizy kategorii filozoficznych zogniskowanych przede wszystkim na pojęciu „duszy rozumnej”. Koncepcja Arystotelesa zakłada animację opóźnioną embrionu ludzkiego. Empiryczne i metafizyczne kategorie znajdują odzwierciedlenie w głoszonych przez Arystotelesa poglądach na temat dopuszczalności przerywania ciąży.

This paper is an attempt to present the context and the essence of the dispute surrounding the understanding of theology as a science ( scientia) in the Aristotelian sense which took place at European universities in the13th-century. The aim of the text is also to indicate selected threads of the dispute, which also seem to be present in today’s metatheological and cultural discussions. Finally, the paper presents a brief presentation of the main strands of the solution to the dispute about the scientific character of theology as proposed by St. Thomas Aquinas. Aquinas’s metatheological proposal is presented owing to its completeness and coherence in addition to its inspiring and enduring character which perdures to the present day.

Today, there is a growing sense of the need to abandon philosophy or theology in favour of science and the convictions of specialists. The analyses presented by Aristotle and St Thomas in terms of the hierarchy of intellectual virtues allow us to draw attention to the conditions and consequences of these demands. In their view, knowledge grows out of certain principles and presuppositions, the evaluation of which belongs to the virtue of wisdom. The virtue of wisdom has as its object the highest principles, the reaching of which requires special methodological and metaphysical attention. In the case of Christian theology, this wisdom is enriched by faith in what God reveals to man. Faith understood in this way goes beyond natural cognition while at the same time having a strong rational basis of a historical and doctrinal nature. Scientific knowledge devoid of metaphysical reflection, as well as methodically dissociating itself from religious faith, can lead to a lack of awareness of one’s own act of faith in relation to one’s own presuppositions. This can entail unconscious transformations of one’s own scientific assumptions into principles of a universal philosophical nature. This can consequently lead to a misjudgement of all that is beyond the competence and methodology of the sciences.