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Abstract

This paper investigates the effect of explicitly informing participants about the objective probability of winning a lottery on the illusion of control. In a procedure based on Experiment 3 from Langer’s 1975 seminal paper, participants were faced with lotteries based on familiar vs. unfamiliar stimuli and either explicitly informed about the objective probability of winning or not (the probability could be derived from other data). Results indicated that stating the objective probability of winning the lottery reduced, but not eliminated the illusion of control. Moreover, Langer’s effect of stimulus familiarity was not replicated. Experiment 2, which included a lottery based on the full set of Polish alphabet letters, confirmed the same effects. Results indicate that illusion of control may be explained by the control heuristic (Thompson et al., 1998) – in absence of explicitly stated probability, participants estimate their chances of winning based on perceived control, even though calculating the objective probability is possible.
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Authors and Affiliations

Karolina Chodzyńska
1
Mateusz Polak
1

  1. Institute of Applied Psychology, Faculty of Management and Social Communication, Jagiellonian University, Krakow, Poland
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Abstract

AIMS: The primary goal of the presented research was to investigate the memory effects of implicit negation, conveyed using implicatures, as compared to explicit negation. We also speculated that implicit negation might require more cognitive effort.

METHODS: Three experiments were conducted (total N = 181), in which participants were presented with a description containing implicit or explicit negation, followed by a memory recognition test of items present, negated or not mentioned in the description. We manipulated the pace at which the description was presented (own pace vs. fixed) and whether participants were informed about the upcoming recognition test.

RESULTS: We found no differences between explicit and implicit negation in the number of false alarms to negated and not mentioned items, response times or time spent reading the source material. Bayesian analyses indicated a 90% probability that there were no differences in the number of false alarms between explicit and implicit negation.

CONCLUSIONS: Implicit and explicit negation lead to a similar quality of recognition, and seem to require a similar amount of time to process, indicating comparable cognitive effort.

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Authors and Affiliations

Józef Maciuszek
Mateusz Polak
Martyna Sekulak
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Abstract

The paper investigates the relations between Schwartz’s values and beliefs which may reflect skepticism toward science – specifically vaccine rejection, climate change denial and creationism. Recent research on the causes of anti-science indicates that they may be motivational, pertaining to ideologies, worldviews, and one’s moral codes. Therefore, we postulated that value priority hierarchies hierarchies may be predictors of anti-science. Results (N = 509) indicated that Conservation metatype values were positively associated with anti-science, while Self-Transcendence and Openness to change metatypes were connected with support for science. We also found significant differences in value profiles between participants with lower vs. higher anti-scientific beliefs. We discuss the possible motivational underpinnings of these results.
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Authors and Affiliations

Józef Maciuszek
1
Mateusz Polak
1
Aleksandra Zajas
1
Katarzyna Stasiuk
1

  1. Institute of Applied Psychology, Jagiellonian University

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