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Abstract

The mathematical connections between microscale and macroscale models of a given piece of physical reality (compare e.g., statistical mechanics with thermodynamics) justify the following correlation thesis: a small change of value of a microscopic parameter (e.g. a change of number of molecules in a given volume of ideal gas) is correlated with a change of value of the associated macroscopic parameter (e.g. a change of temperature of ideal gas). The thesis stands in contradiction to one of the two premises in the sorites paradox, called here the condition of small change (cf. Paul Égré’s ‘tolerance principle’), according to which a small change of value of a microscopic parameter has negligible impact on a change of value of a corresponding macroscopic parameter. Acceptance of the correlation thesis results in a waiving of the condition of small change, and consequently provides a solution of the paradox. The correlation thesis coincides with Bertrand Russell’s view expressed in Vagueness (1923) where he argues that that vagueness in the macroscopic parameter is not of an ontological nature but only of an epistemological character, and is caused by looking at the physical system from a far-away perspective. This inexact picture results in an acquiescence with the inexact conditions that determine the impact of a small ontic change on its representation by the macroscopic ontic parameter. The macroscopic parameter is partly governed by its own conditions, according to the correlation thesis.
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Authors and Affiliations

Marek Nowak
1
ORCID: ORCID

  1. Uniwersytet Łódzki, Instytut Filozofii, ul. Lindleya 3/5, 90‑131 Łódź
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Abstract

In this article I deal with two social encyclical letters – Rerum novarum (1891) and Quadragesimo anno (1931). Also I undertake to discuss the views of Archbishop Wilhelm Emmanuel von Ketteler, who can be regarded as the most important forerunner of the ideas proclaimed later by Pope Leo XIII.

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Authors and Affiliations

Marek Nowak
ORCID: ORCID
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Abstract

In the Two Concepts of Rules (1955) John Rawls presents the following distinction between two concepts of rules governing human action: a rule as summary of past decisions versus a rule defining a practice. The latter concept was incorporated by John Searle (1964, 1969, 1991, 1995) as the key element of his ontology of social facts. For, according to Searle, a rule of such type is used to create a new practice or institution, and consequently, a new kind of conduct in the framework of such institution. Usually (but not always) a sentence expressing such a rule is a definition of special kind with an unexpected feature: what has been defined is a creation of the definition / of the author. The present paper is an attempt to reveal the essential contribution of Rawls to the early stage of development of Searle’s social ontology as well as an attempt to present its development from 1964 onward until the appearance of its full blooded version in 1995. Moreover, particular attention is devoted to the concept of Searle’s definition of institutional object. The special features of the definition indicate the need to distinguish a fourth concept of ‘definition’, a ‘creative definition’, over the three proposed by Kazimierz Ajdukiewicz in his Three concepts of definition (1958).
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Bibliography

Ajdukiewicz K. (1958a), Trzy pojęcia definicji, „Studia Filozoficzne” 5 (8), s. 3–16; również w: tenże, Język i poznanie, t. II, Warszawa: Państwowe Wydawnictwo Naukowe, 1965, s. 296–307.
Ajdukiewicz K. (1958b), Le problème du fondement des propositions analytiques, „Studia Logica” 8, s. 259–272; wyd. pol.: Zagadnienie uzasadniania zdań analitycznych, przeł. H. Mortimer, w: K. Ajdukiewicz, Język i poznanie, t. II, Warszawa: Państwowe Wydawnictwo Naukowe, 1965, s. 308–321.
Ajdukiewicz K. (1965), Język i poznanie, t. II, Warszawa: Państwowe Wydawnictwo Naukowe.
Anscombe G.E.M. (1958), On Brute Facts, „Analysis” 18, s. 69–72.
Friedman R.L. (2021), Peter Auriol, w: E.N. Zalta (red.), The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy, Summer 2021 Edition, https://plato.stanford.edu/archives/sum2021/entries/auriol/
Grice H.P. (1975), Logic and Conversation, w: P. Cole, J.L. Morgan (red.), Syntax and Semantics, t. 3: Speech Acts, New York: Academic Press, s. 41–58; wyd. pol.: Logika a konwersacja, przeł. J. Wajszczuk, „Przegląd Humanistyczny” 21 (1977), nr 6 (141), s. 85–99; oraz Logika a konwersacja, przeł. B. Stanosz, w: B. Stanosz (red.), Język w świetle nauki, Warszawa: Czytelnik, 1980.
Lakoff G., Johnson M. (1980), Metaphors We Live By, Chicago – London: The University of Chicago Press; wyd. pol.: Metafory w naszym życiu, przeł. T.P. Krzeszowski, Warszawa: Państwowy Instytut Wydawniczy, 1988.
Levinson S.C. (2000), Presumptive Meanings: The Theory of Generalized Conversational Implicature, Cambridge, MA – London: The MIT Press.
Rawls J. (1955), Two Concepts of Rules, „The Philosophical Review” 64, s. 3–32.
Searle J.R. (1964), How to Derive „Ought” From „Is”, „The Philosophical Review” 73, s. 43–58.
Searle J.R. (1965), What Is a Speech Act?, w: M. Black (red.), Philosophy in America, Ithaca: Cornell University Press, London: Allen & Unwin, s. 221–239; częściowe wyd. pol.: Czym jest akt mowy?, przeł. H. Buczyńska‑Garewicz, „Pamiętnik Literacki” 1980, nr 2, s. 241–248.
Searle J.R. (1969), Speech Acts, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press; wyd. pol.: Czynności mowy, przeł. B. Chwedeńczuk, Warszawa: Instytut Wydawniczy Pax, 1987.
Searle J.R. (1991), Intentionalistic Explanations in the Social Sciences, „Philosophy of Social Sciences” 21, s. 332–344.
Searle J.R. (1995), The Construction of Social Reality, New York: Free Press.
Sperber D., Wilson D. (1986), Relevance: Communication and Cognition, Oxford: Blackwell Publishers; wyd. pol.: Relewancja. Komunikacja i poznanie, red. M. Jodłowiec, A. Piskorska, Kraków: Tertium, 2011.
Znamierowski Cz. (1921), O przedmiocie i fakcie społecznym, „Przegląd Filozoficzny” 24, s. 1–33.
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Authors and Affiliations

Marek Nowak
1
ORCID: ORCID

  1. Uniwersytet Łódzki, Instytut Filozofii, ul. Lindleya 3/5, 90‑131 Łódź
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Abstract

StreszczenieSzeroko znane, czy wręcz popularne, pojęcia Ajdukiewicza
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Authors and Affiliations

Marek Nowak
ORCID: ORCID

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