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Compatibilism and the objective attitude in the world of clockwork oranges

Przegląd Filozoficzny. Nowa Seria | 2019 | No 4 | 407-423 | DOI: 10.24425/pfns.2019.130927

Keywords compatibilism objective attitude reactive moral sentiments moral responsibility expressivism

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Abstract

The paper focuses on two research objectives. First, it aims to critically examine a reductio ad absurdum argument against incompatibilism whose main themes can be found in Peter F. Strawson’s Freedom and Resentment. The doubts raised about the argument are inspired by a thought experiment based on fictitious Ludovico’s technique described in Anthony Burgess’s novel A Clockwork Orange. The second objective consists in outlining a version of the compatibilist stance – the version which is immune to Strawson’s objections against the traditional rendering of compatibilism and enables deeper understanding of various possible interpretations of the controversy between compatibilists and their opponents. The proposed position includes a hypothesis on the function of the attitude of participation and the expressivist explications of the concepts crucial for the practice of ascribing moral responsibility. The important feature of the analyses in question is the central role of the states of mind whose content are plans for reactive moral sentiments.

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Authors and Affiliations

Adrian Kuźniar

The problem of envy in the context of principles of justice and Rawls’s construction of the original position

Adrian Kuźniar

Przegląd Filozoficzny. Nowa Seria | 2021 | No 4 | 259-273 | DOI: 10.24425/pfns.2021.138986

Keywords difference principle egalitarianism envy J. Rawls self‑respect theory of justice

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Abstract

The paper analyses and develops John Rawls’s defence of his theory of justice against the conservative objection that egalitarian conceptions of social justice are an expression of envy. The defence involves the following claims: (1) The content of the difference principle does not match an essential property of envy. (2) The parties in the original position are not motivated by envy. (3) None of the conditions imposed on the original position arise from envy. Next, it is argued that there are reasons to suppose that the parties in the original position would choose a more egalitarian principle of distributive justice than the difference principle. These reasons are grounded in the claim that self respect is the most important primary good and in the fact that the level of economic inequalities is negatively correlated with self respect among the least advantaged members of society. It is shown that even though the content of the more egalitarian principle matches the essential property of envy, the conservative objection remains unjustified.

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Bibliography

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