We talk to Prof. Jacek Hołowka from the Department of Analytical Philosophy about the pros and cons of utilitarianism, John Stewart Mill's take on politics, and forecasts for Poland's future.

O wadach i zaletach utylitaryzmu, polityce według Milla i prognozach dla Polski rozmawiamy z prof. dr. hab. Jackiem Hołówką z Zakładu Filozofii Analitycznej.

The author believes that one all-inclusive assessment of Marx’s philosophy is inevitably misleading. Although Marx constructed one theory that has a texture of a uniform fabric, the fabric has been woven with threads of two very different qualities. His presentation of capitalist instability, exploitation and alienation has the quality of scientific explanations. But his treatment of dialectic, economy formulated in terms of priceless commodities and his vision of communism is fantastic and arbitrary.

The author argues that the philosophical position of Karl Marx was primarily shaped by three determinants. The first was the traditional Jewish culture, with its high esteem for intellectual effort, for the genius reflected in intellectual discoveries, and for the ambition that influenced interesting life plans and culminated in some visions of an ultimate end in life. The second was neo- -Hegelianism, which Marx himself recognized as a dominant factor in his thought. Thirdly, Marx was affected by Martin Luther, and this influence is in the focus of this paper. The author clams that both Luther and Marx believed that the essential trait of specifically human existence arises from hard work of any kind except the dullest. Both were bewildered by ideological gullibility and blindness of the masses. Both were convinced that this boundless credulity was sustained by fear of eternal damnation spread by the official church and by slave mentality. Finally both claimed that this noxious influence could only be overcome by a revolution in life conditions and by new social ideas. Each, however, entertained a different conception of that desirable revolution.

Bertrand Russell formulated neutral monism by default, unguided by any strong idea of a uniform, monistic world. Apparently he worked under the urge to liberate philosophy from the quarrel between physicalists and idealists. But he did not succeed in defusing the controversy, instead he fanned it with his fresh ideas. He argued that matter was indestructible, that some mental regularities occurred independently of our will, and that they unfold as if guided by natural laws. He claimed that some conscious states were to be interpreted as objective events despite the fact that they were accessible only privately. But the concurrence between physical and mental facts indicated a similarity between the principles that guided them, or pointed to their singular common nature. He did not undertake to defend his unitary theory vigorously and did not claim it was indisputable. Possibly he hoped to find an additional support for his theory some day and this paper responds to this unspoken request.

Each work of literature creates its own world of fiction and presents a series of events that bring that world to life. Such a world is initially evoked by its author, but subsequently continues to exist supported by collective memory and imagination of the readers and critics. Altogether Roman Ingarden admits four metaphysical categories: the real, the ideal, the mental and the intentional world. A puzzling question arises if we inquire how various objects are included into any of these categories. Is it necessary that they meet some qualitative criteria, or is it possible that they are placed in a suitable category by being freely ascribed to it? The author chooses the second option and argues that this is compatible with the eminent role that Ingarden assigned to works of literature.

In his book Mortal Questions (1979) Thomas Nagel discusses four practical moral issues: (1) fear of death, (2) the absurdity of human life, (3) sexual perversion and (4) military massacre. His primary concern is neither to justify moral opprobrium nor to find an appropriate punishment for the culprits. Instead, he wants to clarify motives of those individuals who are not afraid of death, who can deal resolutely with the pointlessness of human life, who are not deeply dismayed by the crudity of some forms of sexual behavior or who refuse to justify whatever forms of military atrocities with higher purposes. He reviews various cases of excessive or deficient moral sensitivity and offers specific, case‑oriented advice on how to deal with them. Nagel favors self‑persuasion in cases of fear of death and argues that the sense of absurd is not much different from skepticism. He proposes to draw a line between private and public aspects of sexual behavior and supports dual evaluation of military activities by distinguishing between the moral value of an act and the moral value of the motives of the actor. He condones no atrocities. These arguments do not add up to constitute a form of moral relativism but, instead, seem to restore intellectual respectability of casuistry.

When discussing justice, John Rawls focuses on smooth functioning, impartiality and social acceptability of the system of political obligations. His theory of justice is forged as a system of liberal democracy combined with constitutionally established principles of welfare state. Although Rawls distinguishes between political and moral norms, he believes that in a welfare constitutional state a reliable method of negotiating between demands of all citizens is accessible by adoption of a social contract. A social contract presupposes a nearly unanimous view on the character of a good political system. This is a case of soft naturalization. The author distinguishes it from hard naturalization that is not applicable to normative political theories.

The author tries to explain what consequences for social morality ensue from the assumption that moral attitudes are expressed not only in words but also in reactive attitudes. P.F. Strawson assumes that acts of resentment can alter attitudes of those who have triggered them by their behavior. On the other hand, we are ready to control our outbursts of short temper and anger to a certain degree if we take into account agents’ motives and their limited ability to exercise self-control. Moreover, it seems that reactive attitudes – though less precise than verbal rebuke – are more frank and straightforward. Nevertheless, why must I, when I hear a mediocre academic researcher brag over and over again about his apparently essential contribution to philosophy, curb my moral assessment of his self-importance to the level of my irritation? Why should I feel constrained to keep my moral disgust in tune with my impatience mixed with amusement? Why shouldn’t I continue to believe that I can be an amiable character and a rigorous moral person at the same time?

StreszczenieCzyny sprawiedliwe muszą spełniać trzy warunki, zdaniem Ajdukiewicza: „zasadę równej odpłaty i zapłaty”, „zasadę równej miary” i „zasadę równouprawnienia”. Opis tych zasad wskazuje, że trafniej byłoby je nazywać: „warunkiem ekwiwalentnej wymiany”, „warunkiem anonimowości” i „warunkiem wstępnej równości”. Pierwszy warunek wymaga, by każdy, kto godzi się na wymianę dóbr, otrzymał coś, co ma taką samą wartość, co przedmiot, z którym się rozstaje. W transakcjach handlowych poza wolnym rynkiem taka zasada jest być może słuszna, jednak w warunkach wolnego rynku wolno ją uznać za zbędną, ponieważ sam rynek dba o ekwiwalentność ustalając ceny. Także poza transakcjami handlowymi pierwszy warunek wydaje się zbędny. Przekonuje o tym Arystoteles, gdy opisuje dary między przyjaciółmi. Drugi warunek żąda bezstronności i bezinteresowności. Ajdukiewicz potępia egoizm grupowy i faworyzowanie wybrańców z własnej wspólnoty. Ponieważ nie dokonuje przy tym żadnych zastrzeżeń, można odnieść wrażenie, że domaga się, byśmy również o cudze dzieci i rodziny dbali jak o własne. Nie wydaje się, by takie żądanie było przekonujące. Więcej nawet, mamy prawo - jak sądzę - obdarzyć szczególną życzliwością i hojnością każdego, kogo nam się podoba, w szczególności osoby nam najbliższe. Trzecia zasada przewiduje, że mamy prawo domagać się czegokolwiek tylko wtedy, gdy to, czego żądamy, będzie nagrodą za pracę i starania, a nie za jakieś dary natury, jak talent lub uroda. Zatem wstępnie - czyli zanim zbierzemy procentujący kapitał - każdy powinien być traktowany tak samo. Wydaje się, że te trzy zasady pozwalają empirycznie ustalać, komu się dzieje krzywda, i testować konkurencyjne metody jej usunięcia.

Roger Scruton repudiates the idea that civil liberty is a natural and unconditionally desirable state of citizenry, while subjection is something degrading and unnatural. He characterizes the conservative political system as a ‘rule by institutions’ supported by a theory of nature and a theory describing the functioning of institutions. National politics results from operations of social and political institutions which have grown out of traditional arrangements, respect raison d’État, and are governed by offices. The author argues that this is a sound interpretation of essential political arrangements, if it can solve the problem of political reconstruction after a period of decline or disintegration. As a matter of fact Scruton offers such a solution in his analysis of various forms of liberalism, one of which he seems to identify with conservatism.

Autor uważa, że opisując poezję Leconte de Lisle’a Henryk Elzenberg odkrył swą własną wrażliwość poetycką. W twórczości Elzenberga wyobraźnia poetycka pełni nie mniejszą rolę niż jego wiedza filozoficzna. W tej postawie należy szukać klucza dla zrozumienia aksjologii Elzenberga.