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UKRAINE, WAR AND RESISTANCE:
RESHAPING SOCIAL COHESION

This paper sheds light on the social cohesion shifts that have occurred in Ukrainian society since 24th February 2022. Drawing on the case study method, the research juxtaposes pre-war surveys with data collected in Ukraine during March-December 2022. The study confirms the comprehensive strengthening of social cohesion at both attitudinal and behavioral levels accompanied by unprecedently high institutional trust, civic identity, and mass-spread volunteering. The article demonstrates that the value of Ukraine's independence became a crucial point for national consolidation under war conditions. The increased mutual support, emotional connectedness, and enhanced horizontal bonds point at the growth of cohesion. It is proposed to treat the practices of resistance, citizens' expectations about the state's future, their feelings associated with this the state and their belief in victory as additional indicators of social cohesion measurement during wartime. Alongside the positive trends, the social cohesion risk zones are identified, too, and countermeasures discussed.

Key words: social cohesion; war; Ukrainian society; practices of resistance; social trust

Introduction

Russia's full-scale military invasion[1] dramatically changed Ukrainian society at all social levels – institutional, group, and individual. It transformed normative systems, the functioning of social institutions, and the quality of social relationships. In times of active warfare, society started to elaborate a renewed system of social norms, senses, and patterns of behavior regarding survival needs.

From the first days of the full-scale invasion, Ukrainian citizens showed unexpectedly strong military and civil resistance matched by the launch of

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[1] Using the term 'war', one underlines that Russia's military invasion of Ukraine started not on February 24, 2022, but in 2014 with the Crimea annexation and Donbas occupation. But this paper is aimed to investigate the chronological period since the full-scale invasion on February 24, 2022.

mass volunteering, charity, mutual support and help, local territorial defense, and the like. At the attitudinal level, such practices of resistance against the aggressor's invasion were accompanied by an increased level of interpersonal and institutional trust and the unprecedented support of the Armed Forces (98%) and the President of Ukraine (93%) (Rating 2022, March 1st). Before 2022 the weak trust in authorities among Ukrainians was one of the specificities constantly outlined in the annual studies of the Institute of Sociology of the National Academy of Sciences of Ukraine, being among the lowest levels of all European countries (Golovakha et al. 2019).

In mass military and civil resistance, Ukrainian society exhibited greater unity than it has ever before. Both the practices of resistance and appropriate social attitudes could be defined as social cohesion elements commonly conceptualized as a 'social glue' holding society together (Jenson 1998). More often the definitions of cohesion deal with the community's capacity to be based on a sense of trust, hope and reciprocity among all members for creating equal opportunities and solving shared challenges (Jeannotte 2003). Although the discussion about the appropriate definition of social cohesion is still open in the academic discourse (Fonseca et al. 2019), many scholars agree on its crucial role in nation-building processes and social well-being (Green et al. 2009; Berger-Schmitt 2002).

Pre-war studies measuring social cohesion have never considered Ukraine as a highly cohesive society. In a comparative study of 47 European countries based on the 2008 European Value Survey, Ukraine exhibited low scores on both behavioral (substantial) and attitudinal (formal) dimensions of social cohesion (Dickes, Valentova 2013). As for the European Social Survey 2012–2013 Ukraine was placed in a middle position among East and Central European countries (Bondarenko et al. 2017). Meanwhile, the indicators were more nuanced - among generally low levels of social cohesion Ukraine scored higher than other countries in this region on interpersonal trust.

The comparative social cohesion measurements mentioned above rely on the quantitative data gathered before Ukraine's Revolution of Dignity in 2014[2] - a dramatic year marked by the Crimean annexation and the start of the armed conflict in Donbas instigated and supported by Russia. In these challenging conditions, the renewed political elites launched a set of democratically oriented reforms promoting European integration of Ukraine (Decree 2014). Decentralization was among these reforms being thereafter considered as the one that significantly empowered bottom-up initiatives in Ukraine at the local level (Aasland, Lyska, 2016).

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[2] European Values Study conducted in 2017 (EVS 2017) included the fieldwork made in Ukraine, but these data have not yet been analysed through the social cohesion research optics.

Further studies (both qualitative and quantitative), conducted in 2019–2020 revealed that the implementation of the Euromaidan reforms affected social cohesion in various ways (Aasland, Kropp 2021). Rather a positive impact on the strengthening of social cohesion in border regions of Ukraine showed the decentralization reform. Meanwhile, legislative changes in the language of instruction at school seemed to produce 'excluding' effects. Thus, the scores on social cohesion indices at the national level showed to be quite mixed in Ukraine, with low trust in the state institutions but a strong sense of belonging at various levels – local, regional, and national (Aasland et al. 2021).

The worldwide pandemic influenced the social cohesion in Ukraine dually. From the macro-social perspective, the pandemic conditions became a 'common challenge' and promoted social consolidation of civil initiatives; however, it also deepened the local differences and the individual capabilities to cope with the crisis conditions (Deineko 2021). Under such circumstances, Ukraine met the full-scale Russian military invasion on 24th February 2022.

Previous research on changes of social cohesion during the wartime conflicts have brought inconclusive results. Based on theoretical overview of 39 published empirical studies on armed conflicts and post-war social cohesion, Fiedler and Rohles (2021) sum up that war conflicts differently and unexpectedly affect social cohesion. Although the war decreases trust (Rohner, Thoenig, Zilibotti 2013) and national identity (Nair, Sambanis 2019) as social cohesion components, many studies find that the wartime significantly increases social and political cooperation (Bellows, Miguel 2009; Grosjean 2014).

The first conclusion on trust and identity is based on 'in-group' and 'out-group' distinguishing proposed by Bauer and the co-authors, in which in-group members are defined as people 'from the same family, village, class, and ethnic group' and out-group members as 'individuals from other ethnic groups or parts of the country' (Bauer et al. 2016: 260). Considering a war as an extreme form of competition, Fiedler and Rohles (2021) assume that prosocial behaviour towards the in-group increases with simultaneous intensification of aversion to the out-group - the opponent in the war. In other words, the war enhances in-group bonding but decreases the out-group bridging that leads to social cohesion weakening at the societal level. Most of the cases analysed by Fiedler and Rohles is based on the experience of civil wars, hence differentiation between in-group and out-group concepts seems to be limited and contextual. In case of the Russian full-scale invasion of Ukraine the in-group concept is spread up to all Ukrainians citizens that are united around the common threat, while the out-group concept refers to the invaders. Therefore, the conclusion proposed by Fiedler and Rohles (2021) does not correspond to the case-study presented in this article, in which the enhanced in-group bonding represents the societal level and indicates rather strengthening of social cohesion at the national level.

Positive effects of conflict on social cooperation have been registered more often in Fiedler and Rohles (2021) research, but the findings are also very nuanced. Bellows and Miguel (2006) research has shown that respondents who experienced conflict were more engaged in local activities. Blattman (2009) has revealed a positive effect only for political participation. Grosjean (2014) highlighted that the victims of conflict were more likely to be active members of an association comparing with non-victims. Another aspect is shown by Hager et al. (2019) to explain the reduction in in-group cooperation. Scholars elaborated the concept of 'disappointment channel' and 'suspicion channel'. In Kyrgyzstan, Uzbeks felt disappointed due to the lack of help from other in their communities ('disappointment channel'), while victims were suspicious as to why they themselves, not others, had been harmed ('suspicion channel') (Hager et al. 2019).

This overview demonstrates that the universal relevance of such studies is hampered by the fact that all conflicts have had different forms, roots and duration moreover the pre-war societal conditions have been unique (the level of democratic development, economic situation and political system). Furthermore, each study relies on the own research strategy and measurement scheme to identify the components of social cohesion. However, they broaden the understanding of war-time social cohesion emphasizing its non-linearity and contextuality. This paper focuses on the peculiarities of the war-time social cohesion in Ukraine to elaborate existing academic outputs.

Regarding this aim, the study seeks to identify the social cohesion shifts that occurred in Ukraine since the beginning of the full-scale invasion on 24th February 2022. Following this goal, the paper suggests searching for answers to the research questions:

- How did the components and dimensions of social cohesion in Ukraine change since the full-scale military invasion?
- What additional indicators of social cohesion could be proposed for studying war-time societies?

Theoretical framework

Despite the numerous studies dedicated to examining the concept of social cohesion, it remains quite a vague phenomenon that is difficult both to define and to measure (Bernard 1999). On the one hand, such a situation is prompted by the double 'status' of this concept relevant for both scientific and policy discourses (Chan et al. 2006). On the other hand, researchers still argue over the differences between the social cohesion components and factors and the ways they could be distinguished. Leaving aside multiple discussions on the

social cohesion issue in work, we focus on the theoretical approach of Chan et al. (2006), emphasizing the importance of distinguishing between conditions and effects of social cohesion and its essence. We also follow their idea of considering social cohesion as a societal attribute that should be studied using the state as the primary unit of analysis, not the community, region, or group.

Chan and the co-authors define social cohesion as 'a state of affairs concerning both the vertical and the horizontal interactions among members of society as characterized by a set of attitudes and norms that includes trust, a sense of belonging and the willingness to participate and help, as well as their behavioral manifestations' (Chan et al. 2006: 290). Despite the primarily static view of social cohesion, their definition gives the impression of being rather complex and measurable. Thus, researchers elaborated and tested the measurement scheme built on two social cohesion dimensions (horizontal and vertical) and two components (subjective and objective), establishing a two-by-two matrix for a set of social cohesion indicators (see table 1).

Table 1. The indicators of social cohesion dimensions and components by Chan et al. (2006)

	Horizontal	Vertical
Subjective	general trust with fellow citizens (interpersonal trust)	trust in public figures, confidence in political and other major social institutions (trust to personalities and institutions)
	willingness to cooperate and help (readiness to cooperate with different social groups)	
	sense of belonging or identity (degree of country's identity)	
Objective	social participation and vibrancy of civil society (membership in civil institutions; depth of participation)	political participation (active citizenship practices – petitions, demonstrations; voting activity)
	voluntarism and donations (readiness and experience of voluntarism and donations)	
	presence of absence of major inter-group alliances or cleavages (readiness or its absence to cooperate on intergroup level)	

The horizontal and vertical dimensions display two layers of social interactions: the horizontal one concentrates on the 'relationship among different individuals and groups within society'; the vertical dimension identifies 'the relationship between the state and its citizens' (Chan et al. 2006: 293). The objective components of social cohesion look at 'people's actual participation,

cooperation and helping behavior, and the subjective one exhibit 'norms and subjective feelings of trust, a sense of belonging and willingness to help' (Chan et al. 2006: 291). For example, trust is displayed as a subjective component being simultaneously constructed on the macrosocial level (as a societal social norm) and produced microsocially by the actors' system of internal determinants (the system of value orientations, opinions, feelings, views). Meanwhile the political participation is categorized as an objective component of social cohesion displaying the type of social practices. Hence, economic, cultural, and political layers remain beyond the measurement scheme and could be considered as social cohesion conditions, factors, or effects. Ultimately, they see social cohesion as a quality of social attitudes and interactions in society.

Despite the empirical accuracy, the proposed model does not exclude some theoretical gaps. Firstly, it assumes the static nature of social cohesion leaving aside the perspective of its social reproduction at the societal level and the appropriate mechanisms. To cover this gap in the theoretical plane the paper draws on the theory of structuration bridging social structures and actors using social practices (Giddens 1984). Through this approach, the dynamic nature of social cohesion reproduction may be outlined and explained. To highlight the dynamic nature of social cohesion components in the empirical plane the comparative research strategy by juxtaposing pre-war survey results with data collected during the war-torn period in Ukraine (March-December 2022) is used.

Secondly, we call into question Chan et al. (2006) limitations regarding the emotional grounds that are behind subjective components of social cohesion. Other theoretical models of social cohesion measurement consider 'positive emotional connectedness between members and the community' as one of the components of a highly cohesive society (Dragolov et al. 2013). That makes it strategically important to enlarge the set of subjective components of social cohesion that may display the transformative power for its reproduction during the war times – when citizens' emotions, feelings, beliefs, and opinions determine the models of behavior. Concerning this gap, the article seeks to find out additional indicators of social cohesion in war-torn Ukraine. Such methodological steps seem to be reasonable taking into consideration the war factor and its crucial differences compared with the peace-time conceptualizations.

Data and methods

The particularity of the war time conditions and the complexity of the social cohesion phenomenon make it relevant to use the case study. This methodological strategy deals with the exploration within the context through various

data sources (Rashid et al. 2019). Moreover, it relies on a variety of research lenses to reveal multiple aspects and naturally occurring contexts that can create a difference (Kaarbo, Beasley 1999). Such a context is created by the full-scale military invasion making the social reality of Ukrainian society unique and unparalleled. The reliance on various empirical sources is conditioned by the lack of field data that can be gathered in Ukraine since February 2022.

Considering the quantitative measurement scheme developed by Chan et al. (2006) we aimed at identifying the social cohesion shifts that occurred during the war by monitoring its quantitative scores along with the text analysis of Ukrainian media and Facebook content used to explain qualitative angles of transformation. Therefore, this paper draws on a threefold case study protocol.

First, to reach the start point of the per-war social cohesion specificities the paper relies on the research results gathered in the Ukrainian–Norwegian research project 'Accommodation of Regional Diversity in Ukraine (ARDU)' (ARDU 2018-2021). This is the nationally representative survey conducted by the Dnipro-based opinion poll agency Operatyvna Sociologia on behalf of the Norwegian Institute of Regional and Urban Research (NIBR) OsloMet in December 2020 (sample size 2100; the method used: telephone interviews). The surveyed population was largely representative in terms of geographical distribution across the country, type of settlement, gender, and age (for details see Baliichuk 2020). The study aimed to capture various dimensions of social cohesion in Ukraine after the decentralization reform implementation.

Second, to identify the social cohesion shifts that occurred since the war started the article draws on the results of the nationwide survey 'War in Ukraine: a sociological survey' conducted by the same Dnipro-based Ukrainian company at the request of the NIBR OsloMet among the general population in mid-March 2022 (sample size 3007; the method used: telephone interviews). The questionnaire covered issues of relocation, current needs, resistance practices, and the psychological and emotional state of the populace (for details see Deineko 2022). We also draw on survey data gathered by 'Operatyvna Sociologiya' (July 27–30, 2022) via the Computer Assisted Web Interview (CAWI) method in the mobile application 'OperSo'. The sample (received questionnaires: 1,507) is representative in terms of gender, age, and region of residence. To cover all indicators of social cohesion we also apply a secondary analysis of nationwide survey results gathered by the Sociological Group 'Rating' (March–November 2022).

Third, to find out qualitative specificities of social cohesion reproduction during wartime the paper incorporates the text analysis of Ukrainian media and Facebook content. These data are primarily used as illustrations to register and explain some tendencies being undetected within the survey results.

Empirical findings
Enhancing 'verticals': political consolidation and prospered institutional trust

Despite the political factors laying beyond the social cohesion measurement, it seems important to stress the key political tendencies since the beginning of the full-scale invasion due to their major influence on the social cohesion indicators. Different political actors united their efforts towards a common goal – Ukraine's resistance and victory in the war. President Zelensky's request for political consolidation was supported by representatives of most political parties on all levels – national, regional, and local from the first days of the war (Radio Svoboda 2022). The President's decision not to flee from Ukraine but to personally lead the national resistance resulted in an unprecedented level of trust and support expressed by Ukrainians. According to the survey results of the Sociological Group 'Rating' as of March 1st, 2022, 93% of Ukrainians supported Zelensky (Rating 2022, March 1st). In comparison, the ARDU survey of December 2020 showed that only 30% partially or fully trusted the President. According to survey results of the Sociological Group 'Rating' in December 2021 this rate was 38% (Rating 2021).

With the beginning of the full-scale invasion, the value of Ukrainian statehood significantly increased in Ukrainians' perceptions. On May 18-19, 2022, the sociological group 'Rating' measured the image of the Ukrainian state by four indicators – state efficiency; state achievements and failures; living conditions; and social expectations (GSR-5 methodology). In November 2021 only 5% of respondents admitted a moderately or strongly positive image of the Ukrainian state, as of May 2022 this rate increased tenfold. Thus, 53% in total evaluated the image of the state positively (Rating 2022, May 18-19th). Furthermore, as of the end of 2022, more than 82% of respondents believe that things in Ukraine are going in the right direction, and only 7% - are in the wrong direction. The assessment of the right direction dominated in all regions and age groups (Rating 2022, November 20-21st). According to the survey results conducted by the sociological group 'Rating' in November 2022 indexes of the quality of housing and communal services, medical care, the fight against corruption, freedom of speech and democracy, and especially the international image have improved in Ukrainian's assessments for the last year (Rating 2022, November 20-21st). What have triggered people to revise and enhance their attitudes toward state services?

First, in contrast to the images of Russian troops stealing toilets and washing machines, Ukrainian citizens have realized that the state and the social order that they have formed during Ukraine's independency is much better than they had thought before the full-scale invasion began. The way how Russian soldiers

acted on the occupied territories, on the battlefield and in the rear influenced Ukrainians' recognition regarding their own achievements in the nation and state building processes during the last 30 years. Second, Ukrainians understood the capacities of the Ukrainian economic system that has demonstrated the ability to cope with the infrastructure demolition, harvest theft and occupation. Third, people became inspired by the local businesses maintaining their activities during blackouts and even in the evacuation. Finally, citizens have seen the support and solidarity coming from all around the globe. It has further strengthened the feeling of being the defenders of the civilization and democracy in Europe. All these factors prompted people to increase the respect and trust towards each other and the Ukrainian state. Therefore, despite the horrific wartimes accompanied by a decline in living standards, life chances, and labor opportunities, people significantly increased their appreciation of Ukraine's capacities as an independent and sovereign state and exhibited the real value of the native state. Under the war conditions citizens united around the idea of na-tion-building and the value of Ukraine's independence.

Vertical trust grew significantly on both national and local levels. From the first days following the full-scale invasion, mayors of Ukrainian towns and cities demonstrated previously unusual patterns of behavior – they spent a lot of time with the citizenry in the bomb shelters, met needs for local territorial defense, participated in rebuilding works, and thus cooperated with locals rather horizontally than vertically. Therefore, citizens became more supportive to local authorities and enhanced trust in them. In December 2020 33% of Ukrainians trusted local authorities (ARDU 2018). On March 1st, 2022 84% expressed support for local authorities' wartime actions (Rating 2022, March 1st). Most of the Ukrainian mayors played a vital role in military and civil resistance on the local level contributing to the maintenance of the bottom-up 'discourse of unity' that contributed to binding local communities. The social distance became shortened among authorities and citizenry – Ukrainian mayors with arms in hands and personally delivering food for people hiding in metro exhibited the 'within community role' instead of previously distanced attitude and the strict distinction between 'authorities' and 'citizens'.

In the ARDU project, the vertical objective social cohesion layer was measured by participation in the last local elections and the practices of signing petitions, demonstrations, and hearings for solving local issues. The project identified quite low levels of political participation, with 50% describing their activity as very rare for signing petitions and participating in demonstrations and public hearings (Aasland et al. 2021). The indicators of political participation during the wartime should be revised due to the limitations provided by martial law (Law of Ukraine 2015). Elections are prohibited and civil strikes or demon-strations are restricted. The variety of political participation during the war is

largely limited to such practices as military and civil resistance – joining the army, participation in territorial defense, patrolling the local territories, weaving nets (used for military purposes), and volunteering buildings for both military and civil purposes. Consequently, the boundary between vertical objective social cohesion components (political participation) and horizontal objective ones (social participation, voluntarism, and donations) became blurred since the beginning of the war. Civil society actors united their efforts to assist state institutions and military needs, erasing the horizontal/vertical demarcation line. That makes it strategically important to notice a new indicator of social cohesion measurement under the war circumstances – 'the practices of resistance' that interconnects vertical and horizontal dimensions within objective components of social cohesion.

Bridging 'horizontals': the new quality of social interactions

According to the joint survey by Ilko Kucheriv Democratic Initiatives Foundation and the Kyiv International Institute of Sociology conducted in 2019, only 9% of Ukrainians were involved in volunteering and 25% experienced charitable or material assistance to people or organizations (Ilko Kucheriv Democratic Initiatives Foundation 2019). The survey demonstrated that the number of Ukrainians who did not intend to participate in the NGOs activities increased significantly from 36% in 2018 to 51% in 2019. The latter and other indicators used in the survey exhibit the decline of the civil society capacities in the pre-pandemic period. The beginning of COVID-19 pandemic seems to become the mobilizing factor for strengthening social participation and mutual help in Ukraine. As shown by the ARDU survey results from December 2020, 54% of the respondents declared they helped people outside their families with different issues often or rather often.

The full-scale military invasion of Ukraine prompted the utilization of mass volunteering and mutual support among Ukrainians. People from different regions helped each other and hosted IDPs from the war zones, reoriented their businesses towards military and civil needs, and donated money to support the Armed Forces of Ukraine. The research survey 'War in Ukraine: a sociological survey' held in March 2022 revealed that only 16% of Ukrainians were not engaged in any type of volunteering (Deineko 2022). According to the correlation analysis, people tried to be effective in areas where they thought they had aptitude: women were more active in helping others and making monetary donations; men – in participating in territorial defense, institutionalized volunteering, conducting cyberattacks; the oldest – in non-formal volunteering.

Concerning the financial situation, neither the richest, nor poorest citizens, but middle-income Ukrainians were the most active in volunteering.

As for the survey results conducted by 'Operatyvna Sociologiya' in July 2022, Ukrainians have not become 'tired' of volunteering in the fifth month of the full-scale war – the rate of non-involvement in volunteering stayed the same (16%). Moreover, the practice of monetary donations has increased – from 29% in March to 36% in July. Such quantitative tendencies are aligned with the variety of nationwide charitable projects. A bright example as regards is 'National Bayraktar' (Suspilne 2022) when within three days citizens donated money to buy four Bayraktar drones for the Armed Forces of Ukraine. After the fighters captured in the Azovstal siege were freed and arrived in Ukraine, citizens raised more than 6.6 million hryvnias (more than 180.000 euros) for the treatment of Mariupol defender Mykhailo Dianov just in one day (Rivne Media 2022). Multiple examples of financial and practical support addressed by both military and civil actors testify to the appearance of a new aspect of Ukrainian identity: being Ukrainian under the war means mounting resistance.

Widespread volunteering prompted more intensive interactions between people at the local level and across the whole country. By helping and supporting each other citizens have built trust and emotional connectedness. Mass volunteering and donations became common not only among civil society activists but among all citizens. State institutions and local authorities reoriented their approach to meeting citizens' survival needs. The pre-war 'exchange regime' inherent in relationships between the state and citizens as well as among other social actors (civil society, business initiatives, etc.) primarily based on financial relationships and mutual obligations switched to the 'gifting regime' grounded on willingness to help without expecting any immediate reciprocation. Thus, humanitarian aid, free evacuation from the war zones, hosting IDPs, and other types of services (e.g., medical and legal consultations) provided by both state institutions and private initiatives may be stressed as empirical indicators of such a 'gifting regime'. For instance, the Mayor of Kharkiv, Ihor Terekhov, announced an exemption from payment for utilities from February to June 2022 (Kharkiv Today 2022). Although such an approach was determined by citizens' incapabilities to satisfy basic needs because of war detriment, it also contributed to the new quality of interactions among different social actors in Ukrainian society under the war based on trust, support, and desire to help.

All these facts prompted a new quality of social interactions – Ukrainians became more horizontally bridged and bonded, gaining social capital (Putnam 2000). By helping each other in different parts of the country people extended their networks and gained new social ties that lead to enhancing of bridging social capital 'encompassing people across diverse social cleavages' (Putnam

2000: 22). Parallel to this, common existential risks experienced by Ukrainians hiding in the bomb shelters activated more tight communications and interactions withing existing networks in local and professional communities, among friends and family members (strengthening of the positive in-group bonding by Patulny and Svendsen 2007).

Moreover, the linkages between bridging and bonding social capital became more distinct and obvious. The situation of hosting strangers is revealing in this regard. Coleman's concept of 'bridging bias' exhibits the ability for strangers to co-operate deriving from shared values and ultimately out of mutual trust (Coleman 1988). 'Bridging bias' is the starting point that enables the situation of hosting among people that did not know each other or had weak ties before. Meanwhile the common space for living causes informal cooperations and communications that could increase trust, build strong ties, reciprocity and informal activities that are defined by Rodger and Svendsen as 'positive type of in-group bonding' as a variation of bonding social capital (Patulny, Svendsen 2007: 44).

This tendency was also indirectly displayed by social advertisements appearing along Ukrainian roads throughout the country in March 2022. The social actors on these road boards were Ukrainian cities speaking with each other. They expressed warm words of support, greetings, and care ('Kherson, hang tight! We are with you!' – Kharkiv; 'Mariupol, we will host everyone!' – Uzhhorod; 'Kharkiv, thank you!' – Ivano-Frankivsk) (Trukha, 2022). It shows the force of emotional connectedness between different regions of Ukraine, the new quality of interregional cooperation blurring the regional differences. Thus, interpersonal trust was also enhanced during the war times. According to the Gradus Research Company, social trust in acquaintances (+6%), neighbors (+13%), residents of the settlement (+14%), and people in general (+9%) increased statistically significantly for June 2022 compared with data on October 2021 (Gorbachyk 2022). These findings signal that Ukrainians did not give up or despair, but rather mobilized their capacities and self-initiatives for mutual support during the stressful and existentially dangerous war period.

Identity shifts under the war

One of the key indicators of horizontal subjective social cohesion is a sense of belonging or degree of a country's identity. There are different methodological approaches to measure people's models of identification. We will rely on the one developed by the National Science Academy of Ukraine and annually measured in Ukrainian society from the first years of independence. Scholars questioned people to indicate an identity model that suited them the most among the list of civic, ethnic, soviet, local, regional, European, global models

of identification ('With whom do you identify yourself first of all?'). In 1992 just after the USSR collapse only 45.6% of respondents chose the civic identity ('I am the citizen of Ukraine') as the 'first-choice' identity; 24% identified themselves as residents of the native village or city and 12.7% as citizens of the former Soviet Union as a first choice (KIIS, 2022). These data are not surprising, as the newly established state needed some time to propose and elaborate the senses and meanings for the new identity models. The young Ukrainian state had to work with the variety of ethnic groups, languages, religions, regions and political histories being inherited from the Soviet times by dealing with two simultaneous processes – inclusion (generating the self) and exclusion (distinguishing the others).

Summarizing the fails of the nation building process in Ukraine Kuzio highlights that from the first years of independency the Ukrainian ruling elites had not succeed 'to reach a consensus as to who the actual "other" is' (Kuzio 2001: 361). Moreover, the understanding of 'others' was blurred and fragile being changed due to the circulation of the pro-European and pro-Russian political elites. Therefore, the dynamics of the civic identity was far from being linear – from strengthen after the Orange Revolution in 2004 and the Revolution of Dignity in 2014 to significant drop during the period of Yanukovych's presidentship. The most significant leap occurred since the full-scale invasion (from 64.6% in February 2022 to 84.6% in July 2022). Thus, from 1992 to 2022 the civic identity has increased almost twice – from 45.6% to 84.6%, thereby replacing all other types of identity (KIIS, 2022). The latter shows how the formula of social cohesion 'closure in response to the common threat' (Simmel 1903) united Ukrainians under the civic identity model. All this gives grounds to assume that the civic model of identity ('I am the citizen of Ukraine') acquires the properties of an 'inclusive identity' (Leininger et al. 2021) being particularly beneficial for social cohesion because it allows people to identify with an overarching identity that bridges group divides. Such an identity shift is underpinned by the increased frequency of the Ukrainian language in daily communications and a significant decline in Russian information content consumption (Rating 2022, August 17-18th). This has become the new point of the nation-building process that emerged in a bottom-up fashion in Ukraine since the beginning of the war. In this civic unity, the previously proclaimed regional differences got less tangible or even disappeared. The survey results on August 17-18th, 2022, showed no significant regional and age differences in Ukrainians' civic identification (Rating 2022, August 17-18th).

Fewer and fewer Ukrainians have recognized themselves as soviet people, going from 12,7% in 1992 to 0,9% in 2022 (KIIS, 2022). The latter could be explained by the fact that the soviet identity is perceived by Ukrainians as being associated with 'Russians' via common Soviet past. After the military invasion,

multiple shelling of civilians and civil infrastructure, and the abundant war crimes committed by the Russian troops in occupied territories people refused the soviet model of identity emphasizing the 'othering' and 'separation' from the out-group presented by the invaders. More complex and deep cultural shifts should be noticed in this regard. For instance, according to the survey results conducted by the sociological group 'Rating' on November 20-21st, 2022, the number of Ukrainians celebrating Christmas on December 25 has increased over the past year (from 4% to 11%) (Rating 2022, November 20-21st). 25% have two celebrations on December 25th and January 7th (18% in 2021) and only 55% prefer January 7th (71% in 2021). Ukrainians who support the idea of moving the Christmas celebration to December 25 also significantly increased over the year: from 26% to 44%. Such moods display people's desire to approach western culture and religious traditions and to separate from the religious norms coming from the Russian orthodox legacy. This tendency has become even more tangible against the background of the Ukrainian Orthodox Church of the Moscow Patriarchate representatives' involvement in disinformation about the political situation in Ukraine and the situation at the front (Radio Svoboda 2022).

New cleavages to overcome: social cohesion risk-zones

Most likely, after the war is ended the systems of social stratification and social mobility in Ukrainian society will be redefined drawn on the criteria of individual and collective contributions to Ukraine's victory. It is reasonable to assume that most life chances and various opportunities for political, economic, and social promotion will be provided for the key social actors with the highest level of trust – representatives of the Ukrainian Army and active volunteers. This situation had been partially realized in Ukraine after the Revolution of Dignity in 2014 when the most vocal participants supplanted the previous members of Ukrainian political circles.

However, reflections on victory contributions and life chances restructuring may prompt the appearance of new social cleavages in Ukrainian society. Chan and the co-authors use the presence or absence of major inter-group alliances or cleavages as one of the indicators of social cohesion. The latter tends to test 'whether there exists any emerging inter-group alliances or cleavages in societies' (Chan et al. 2006: 296). It is concluded that both alliances and cleavages weaken social cohesion and divide society as a whole. As an example of the potentially risky zone the social position and the role of Ukrainian refugees and IDPs could be noticed as regards. Even though 90% of citizens staying in Ukraine display normal or positive attitudes towards the Ukrainian refugees (with only

5% condemning them) as of the end of 2022 (Kyiv International Institute of Sociology 2022), some manifestations of the exclusion risks may appear. Grounds for such warns could be found in the social media posts outlining that 'those who left' are sometimes socially excluded, misunderstood, or even blamed by 'those who stayed'.

As an example, the comments on the news story about two women from Kharkiv who fled to Bukovina (western Ukraine) at the beginning of the invasion could be analyzed (Suspilne 2022). Now they live in a high mountain village and are hosted by friends whom they help with the household. Women want to return home when it is safe, while they are getting used to the new way of life. Table 2 exhibits some quotes marked by us as provoking social exclusion among the comments on the Facebook post.

Table 2. Facebook comments on the media story provoking social exclusion and cleavage appearance *(emphasis added by the author)*

Original comments	Translated version
'А **ми** і зараз в Харкові і **допомагаємо** нашому місту...'	'But **we** are still in Kharkiv **helping** our city...'
'Гарні хлопці! **Живуть собі**. А **наші** воюють...'	'Nice guys! They live for themselves. But **ours** are fighting...'
'О це дійсно переселенці, а не ті що в місті бігають по всіх точках **де гроші отримати**, де продукти, або сидять у кафе і **зараз відпочивають** у Болгарії, **знімають дорогі квартири** по 400 - 500 доларів.'	'Oh, these are really IDPs, and not those who run around the city by all the points **where to receive money**, where to get food, or sit in a cafe and **are vacationing** in Bulgaria now, **renting expensive apartments** for 400-500 dollars.'

It is not superfluous to notice that such images of social perception are 'received' and even internalized by some Ukrainian refugees. At least the evidence could be found in the media discourse: 'You don't know where to go, you feel like a traitor because you left'; 'I'm tired of thinking that I'm safe here when others are dying. I feel like a traitor' (Nash Vybir 2022). Hate speech manifestations, creating the image of 'cowards' and 'traitors', addressed towards Ukrainian refugees and IDPs may be noticed as social cohesion risk zones both during the war and after Ukraine's victory. It also raises the question of refugees' and IDPs' successful return and reintegration. It is strategically important to bridge these cleavages from the inception: the proactive support of Ukraine realized by the Ukrainian refugees may help to avoid the excluding effect in the future owing to participation in the practices of resistance.

Additional components of social cohesion in the war-torn society

Even though Chan et. al. (2006) view social cohesion as a static phenomenon, we tend to highlight its dynamic nature during the war times, especially regarding understanding the grounds of its social reproduction on the societal level. What are the grounds for enhanced social cohesion reproduction and maintaining under the war? The war-time realities bring not only new social practices (for instance, as it was demonstrated - the practices of resistance) but also new social senses, expectations, and beliefs as subjective components of social cohesion.

One of such core senses is rooted in Ukraine's strong belief in victory that could be considered as a subjective component of both horizontal and vertical dimensions of social cohesion. This is insofar as the victory concept represents the unity of both the state and the citizen's efforts and contributions. Therefore, the division into horizontal or vertical dimensions seems redundant. As of the end of November 2022 most citizens (97%) are confident in Ukraine's capability to repel Russia's attack (in March 2022, 88% believed in this perspective) (Rating 2022, November 20-21st; Rating 2022, March 1st). Rephrasing Thomas sociological theorem, the way the actors reflect on their future influences their actions and behavior in the present (Thomas, Thomas 1928). In this regard, Ukrainians strongly believe in the victory not only speeding up this long-awaited moment but prompt to maintain the practices of resistance both civil and military. Two-thirds expect that 2023 will be better than the previous year, 12% believe that it will be the same, and only 16% - that it will be worse (Rating 2022, November 20-21st). These data show more optimistic people's moods, compared to previous studies. Also, almost 90% look at the year 2023 with optimism, and only 6% with pessimism (Rating 2022, November 20-21st). On the one hand, such survey results may seem to be paradoxical because it is hard to imagine the optimistic views while living in destroyed cities under constant shelling, in the conditions of the inflation and sharp economic downturn. On the other hand, the specificity of the war-torn society highlights the power of the microsocial perspective as well as how the objective reality may contrast with the subjective one. These data show up the importance of the subjective component of social cohesion and its transformative power during war times – when with a help of their own believes, moods and esteems people achieve and speed up the common good – Ukraine's Victory in the war.

Other theoretical models of social cohesion measurement consider 'positive emotional connectedness' as one of the components of a highly cohesive society (Dragolov et al. 2013). The latter becomes even more relevant during the war times, which are characterized by changeable emotions people experience during this challenging time. As of August 2022, the main emotion citizens feel thinking about Ukraine is pride (75%). In 2021 only 34% of Ukrainians

felt pride; the most common emotion regarding Ukraine was sadness - 37% (Rating 2022, August 17-18th). The feeling of pride plays an important role in maintaining both subjective and objective components of social cohesion in Ukrainian society during the war. It seems a somewhat difficult to insert this indicator into Chan et al. (2006) social cohesion scheme, however, it tends to be among subjective components playing on both grounds – horizontal (being associated with the nation) and vertical (being associated with the state). Such a shift from sadness to pride indicates how citizens have re-evaluated attitudes towards their own state by being inspired by either military or civil achievements under the wartime. In these conditions the value of Ukraine's independence that has become a scarcity value because of enemy's aggression has formed the basis for national consolidation under war conditions.

Concluding discussion

Crucial changes that occurred in Ukrainian society since the beginning of Russia's full-scale military invasion have indicated a comprehensive strengthening of social cohesion on the societal level basing on at least two mechanisms of its social reproduction. First, Simmel's formula of 'closure in response to the common threat' (the Russian invasion) has clarified the border between in-group (citizens of Ukraine) and out-group (invaders). The images of Russian troops stealing toilets and washing machines from the battlefield influenced Ukrainians' recognition of their own achievements in the nation and state building processes during the last 30 years. Therefore, despite the atrocities of war accompanied by a decline in living standards, people increased the respect and trust towards each other and the Ukrainian state. Necessity to fight against the 'common threat' and enhanced value of Ukraine's independence have formulated the meaning of the 'common good' in the war-torn society - the Ukrainian victory. The strong will and actions towards speeding up Ukraine's victory in the war with an absolute level of support and belief in it have become the national-building idea for the Ukrainian society under the conditions of war. The latter contributed to the spread of mass volunteering, monetary donations, mutual support (in other words, the practices of resistance), and trust in political and state institutions unprecedented over the entire history of independent Ukraine. Thereby, virtually all social actors united their efforts against the 'common threat' and towards the 'common good' by launching a dual mechanism for social cohesion strengthening and reproducing.

It is equally important that Ukrainians significantly enhanced their civic identity erasing previously existing regional differences in this field. The civic model of identity ('I am the citizen of Ukraine') has acquired the properties of

an 'inclusive identity' being particularly beneficial for social cohesion because it allows people to identify with an overarching identity that bridges group divides. Enhancement of the civic identity relates to the practical grounds: people's consolidation around the value of Ukraine's independence consequently led to the appearance of a new aspect of Ukrainian citizenry under the war: being Ukrainian means mounting resistance. Since February 24th, 2022, most Ukrainians have experienced a new social role installed in their civic identity – volunteering for resistance. The nation-building process during wartime was accompanied by mutual support and emotional connectedness among Ukrainians from different regions, age groups, and professional communities.

The Ukrainian case proposes new components of social cohesion measurement in a war-torn society (see table 3). The practices of resistance occur in both military and civil dimensions, they follow the horizontal and vertical models of interactions and are aimed at Ukraine's victory in the war. The practices of resistance have a 'multigroup' character combining the efforts of various social actors and involving non-traditional groups (children weaving nets in schools together with parents as actors of resistance). Moreover, they are implemented both within certain institutional formats and out of them with a wide range of tactical tasks - protection, security, evacuation, transportation, logistics, donations, and the like. They are focused on assistance to the Armed Forces of Ukraine and vulnerable groups. Being realized by different social actors the practices of resistance implement the state functions quite commonly by the force of civil initiatives.

The war-time realities have brought not only new social practices, but also new social meanings, expectations, and beliefs as subjective components of social cohesion. One of such core senses is rooted in Ukrainians' strong belief in victory that could be considered as a subjective component of both horizontal and vertical dimensions of social cohesion. Other important indicators are the citizens' expectations about the state's future (now it is prevailing optimism) and the feelings associated this the state (75% of Ukrainians feel pride associated with Ukraine). Such a combination of citizens' future expectations and the mass-spread practices of resistance reproduce the Ukrainian society under the war as a highly cohesive one.

However, despite the prospered horizontal bonds and high trust among different social actors, Ukrainian society faces the appearance of new social cleavages, challenging the strengthening of social cohesion. One of such possible cleavages (and not the deepest one) is between 'those who stayed' and 'those who left' as an implication of the distinction between in-group and out-group. It is important to reflect on the ways to overcome and prevent hate speech and stigmatization of Ukrainian refugees and IDPs. Ukrainian refugees' active volunteering and building an international network for support and promotion

of Ukrainian interests abroad could become effective measures as regards. Quite predictably, such social cleavages will appear around the collaborators and ethnic Russians. These social cleavages seem to become the most tangible and challenging for maintaining a highly cohesive Ukraine in the post-war period, which makes them strategically important as a subject matter of further research.

Table 3. The additional indicators of social cohesion measurement for the war-time societies (modified by the author based on Chan et al. 2006 conceptualizations)

	Horizontal	Vertical
Subjective	general trust with fellow citizens (interpersonal trust)	trust in public figures, confidence in political and other major social institutions (trust to personalities and institutions)
	willingness to cooperate and help (readiness to cooperate with different social groups)	
	sense of belonging or identity (degree of country's identity)	
	The believe in victory	
	Citizens' expectations about the state future	
	Citizens' feelings associated this the state	
Objective	social participation and vibrancy of civil society (membership in civil institutions; depth of participation)	political participation (active citizenship practices – petitions, demonstrations; voting activity)
	voluntarism and donations (readiness and experience of voluntarism and donations)	
	presence of absence of major inter-group alliances or cleavages (readiness or its absence to cooperate on intergroup level)	
	The practices of resistance	

To summarize, the case of Ukrainian society under the wartime conditions contributes to the small body of literature showing the strengthening of the societal cohesion during the war. In addition, it exhibits how the new quality of social interactions among different social actors in the society could reshape and broad the formulas and mechanisms whereby of social cohesion is reproduced. The Ukrainian case shows how this new quality can make cohesion more dependent on the bottom-up initiatives and generate 'the inclusive identity' as a core for the nation building in the post-war times.

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