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The Relationship between Belief in Conspiracy Theories and Political Apathy

Abstract: Conspiracy theories are the beliefs that play an important role in individuals' decision-making, and studies indicate that they also have a significant effect on political behavior. The present study explores the relationships between belief in conspiracy theories, political powerlessness, and political apathy in an Iraqi sample (N =188) from a local community in which they have answered the study questionnaires. Belief in conspiracy theories has been linked to both political powerlessness and political apathy. Further analysis revealed that the relationship between belief in conspiracy theories and political apathy was mediated by political powerlessness. The findings suggest that conspiracy theories related with many political factors, the mediation model explained 30% of the variation in political apathy; other elements appear to contribute to it, also it appears that members of the research community have gravitated toward political apathy as a result of their sense of political powerlessness.

Keywords: *Conspiracy Theories, Political Powerlessness, Political Apathy*

A conspiracy theory is a hypothetical plot involving powerful people or organizations cooperating in secret to achieve some, typically sinister, purpose (Wood et al., 2012, p.767). The notion of conspiracy theories has resurfaced, and some arguments that it has been a very important psychosocial phenomenon of the contemporary period (COVID-19), with many studies indicating that the emergence of conspiracy views during times of crisis is not a new phenomenon (Imhoff& Lamberty,2020). Following each crisis (economic, health, or other) and the emergence of conspiracy ideas, researchers were interested in the ramifications of conspiracy theories, suggesting that conspiracy theories could have potentially major societal and political effects (Jolley et al., 2020; Jolley& Douglas, 2014; Douglas et al., 2019). For example, increased prejudice towards intergroup (Jolley et al., 2020), increased radicalized and extremist behavior. The results of the studies indicated an association between conspiracy theories and political behavior, such as decreased voting, decreased political trust (Douglas et al., 2019), decreased willingness to reduce one's carbon footprint, and participation in politics (Jolley& Douglas, 2014).

Conspiracy theories are widespread in all the countries around the world, but they are remarkably widespread in the Middle East, influencing Middle Eastern political life (Pipes, 1997). Conspiracy theories, according to Butter and Reinkowski, are not a fringe phenomenon in this region and pervade society on all levels (Butter &

Reinkowski,2014), and according to Matthew Gray, conspiracy theories in the Middle East serve as an affective tool of political mobilization for the region (Gray,2010). These theories often treated as facts even by political and cultural elites (Butter & Reinkowski, 2014).

The media in the Middle East and Arab region plays a key role in spreading and promoting conspiracy theories (AL-kandari, 2010, United States Institute of Peace, 2005), as websites and social media do (Runnels, 2015; Kopchick, 2018; Abalakina et al, 1999), and political discourse (Gray, 2010; Jamal et al, 2015).Many conspiracy theories are circulating in the Middle East, including claims that the US created the Islamic State and is the secret instigator of the Arab Spring revolutions, and that the Bush administration planned the 9/11 attacks to further suppress and start wars in the Middle East and with Israel (Erlich, 2017; Butter & Reinkowski, 2014).Many studies have found that conspiracy theories beliefs are one of the main factors for decreased political engagement (Imhoff & Lamberty, 2020; ArdèvolAbreu et al.,2020; Douglas et al,2019). In general, political engagement has decreased over the world, whether in the West or the East (Uberoi& Johnston, 2019; Mohamed, 2018; Ekman & Amna, 2012). Some research has found that believing in conspiracy theories leads individuals to have low intentions of participation or political engagement (Imhoff et al.,2019; Jolley& Douglas,2014), while other researches have found that exposure to conspiracy theories

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lead to increased political engagement especially non-normative political acts (Kim,2019, Imhoff et al.,2019), and it appears that there is no consensus in the literature as to whether conspiracy beliefs decrease or increase political intentions.

According to Hofstadter (1964), one's belief in conspiracy theories stems from a sense of powerlessness and people who feel powerless propagate these views. Conspiracy beliefs are more widespread among vulnerable social groups such as immigrants and minorities, as well as persons with a lesser level of education, according to researchers. Zonis and Joseph (1994) criticized Hofstadter (1956) for simplifying conspiracy beliefs, whereas Young (1990) argues that conspiracy beliefs assist people retain their self-esteem because they make them perceive themselves as ideal and others as evil. Conspiracy beliefs, according to Robins and Post (1997), are fueled by feelings of helplessness and an inclination to follow leaders. There are five reasons why individuals believe in conspiracies, according to Abalakina and others (1999): Their feelings of isolation, helplessness, simplifying a complex world, and utilizing conspiracies to explain their issues, as well as their beliefs, serve as a source of hostility (Abalakina ,1999).Other research, on the other hand, suggests that people are drawn to conspiracy theories when their psychological requirements are not met. The first set of wants is epistemic, which includes satisfying curiosity and avoiding uncertainty; the second group is existential, which includes feelings of threat to security, control, and helplessness; and the third group is social, which includes insufficient appreciation; the need for affiliation and positive consideration (Douglas, 2021). As conspiracy beliefs provide a desirable explanation for one's lack of power, Imhoff and Lamberty (2020) argue that supporting conspiracy beliefs leads to feelings of powerlessness, undermines perceptions of political efficacy, and ultimately leads to apathy and inaction. Individuals who feel powerless gravitate to non-normative forms of protest because they feel powerless in traditional forms of protest, therefore conspiracy theories may lead to the contrary and engage in political activity and forms of political protest (Vegetti & Littvay, 2021), Many studies have shown that political powerlessness is linked to conspiracy theory beliefs (Abalakina-Paap et al, 1999; Jolley& Douglas, 2014; van Prooijen, 2018; Douglas et al, 2019).

Stephanopoulos defines political powerlessness as "A group is relatively powerless if its aggregate policy preferences are less likely to be enacted than those of similarly sized and classified groups" (Stephanopoulos, 2015, p.1531), however, for Finifter political powerlessness reflects "an individual's feeling that [s]/he cannot affect the actions of the government... [and that] the heart of the political process...is not subject to his[her] influence (Dahl et al.,2017,p.6).

The consequences of believing in conspiracy theories on political behavior, according to Douglas (2021), include political apathy among individuals, such as a reluctance to participate in elections, a loss of political confidence, and

a weak tendency to vote or participate in political campaigns. Research has linked beliefs in conspiracy theories with political powerlessness (Jolley& Douglas, 2014).

The concept of political apathy has grown since the middle of the last century, Rosenberg (1951) argue that political apathy tends to be self-reinforcing, when there are no social pressures imposed on the individual and the individual notices that prominent personalities do not participate in political action, and political apathy occurs among individuals, Likewise, the scene of social inactivity and collective aversion to political participation, and thus apathy reinforces itself. Rosenberg argues that politics may fail to meet some individual needs, or that the satisfaction of these needs may be jeopardized. He identified three factors that promote political indifference including; first, an individual may avoid politics because of feelings of psychological deficiency or weakness. Second, due of negative reactions from society's culture, an individual may avoid politics. Third, an individual may reject politics because it fails to meet his or her immediate requirements. In our modern and complex society, Rosenberg believes that an individual's outlook or philosophy about life, which discourages work or political resolve, is fatalism and powerlessness. Individuals perform sensitive duties inside a complex economic fabric, and firms and massive political and economic blocs make the person feel powerless and weak in the face of these institutions, as well as that his strength is limited and that he cannot change. Nothing will match his helplessness and feeble voice in front of the noise of the media and politicians, and this sense of helplessness is coupled by a sense of fatalism (Rosenberg, 1951).

Dean (1960) believes that political apathy are voting or not voting, where political apathy is understood as a lack of political participation whereas political apathy (Dahl et al., 2017), Thompson and Horton (1960) define political apathy as a general indifference to politics: an apathetic individual has a low level of political awareness and knows enough about it to conclude that he is not driven to become more involved (Pap et al., 2018, p. 579). According to Fox (2015), a lack of desire or motivation to interest in politics and differs from political alienation. As alienation is an active trend with a high level of cognitive awareness, people who are uninterested in politics are more aware of what they are alienated from, there is a conceptual differentiation between political powerlessness and political apathy in terms of structure and function, the political powerlessness is in the form of high cognitive awareness of the situation, unlike political apathy, where the cognitive awareness of individuals is very low (Dahl et al., 2017).

Also political apathy a uni-dimensional concept while political powerlessness is apart or dimension of political alienation (Vox,2015), also differ in behavioral consequences, low motivation to political participation at political apathy ,while in political powerlessness, motivated the individuals may refusing to vote, or, choosing to voice discontent (Dahl et al., 2017).

Mills and Riesman about political apathy, that a sense of the loss of influence, lack of interest and distance to those in power caused political apathy, the alienation (for example political powerlessness), discouragement and, consequently contribute to the political apathy, also Korzeniowski maintains that low efficiency (powerlessness) with high expectations of the society may lead to the evolution of the public feelings: disappointment – frustration – alienation – apathy (Prokop & Hrehorowicz, 2019).

Several studies have proven that individuals with conspiracy theories are more inclined to weak or lack political participation, or political violence. Also studies (Abalakina-Paap, 1999; Douglas, 2019) have found that conspiracy theories make individuals feel powerlessness, as well as Rosenberg specified that political may fail to meet the basic requirements of people, which leads to their feelings of powerlessness and despair and thus a lack of interest in politics. There are a variety of political behaviors that may be linked to conspiracy theories, and we argued that political apathy is one of them. Also Dean (1965) believes that powerlessness is linked to political apathy, and the study of (Dahl et al. 2017) also found a relationship between political apathy and powerlessness.

In line with results of previous studies, it appears that there is a relationship between belief in conspiracy and political behavior, especially the desire not to participate in politics, and appears in the form of decreased participation in political activities. Previous studies focused on the variable of political powerlessness as a variable that decreases political participation, but there are also those who point out that political powerlessness leads to a feeling of political apathy, but powerlessness in turn leads to a feeling of indifference to the existing political situation due to the emergence of the idea of the inability to change the status quo, such as the study Prokop and Hrehorowicz (2019), and Rosenberg (1951), who also indicated that the feeling of indifference is reinforced by feelings of powerlessness and inadequacy that afflicts individuals. There are also lack of studies that dealt with variables in the Middle East, despite their wide spread among individuals, especially with regard to their relationship to political behavior. In previous Iraqi elections, any observer could see a decrease in the gradual abstention rate, particularly in the 2018 election, and citizens came to the conviction, however fictitious, that voting is futile in bringing about political change (Mansour & Toorn, 2018; Musawy, 2018).

The current research suggests withdrawal or weakness of democratic participation by individuals, especially those who believe in conspiracy theories based on data and gradually low rates of participation in the elections taking place in Iraq, as mentioned in the introduction to the research. The first study aim was to analyze the relationship between beliefs in conspiracy theories, political powerlessness and political apathy. The second aim of the study was to see if beliefs in conspiracy theories can predict political apathy, and to examine a potential mediator of this projected political powerlessness, it was

assumed that Belief in Conspiracy Theories would be positively related to Political Powerlessness and Political Apathy, also that Belief in Conspiracy Theories and Political Powerlessness would be predicting Political Apathy.

METHODOLOGY

Participants

One hundred eighty-eight Iraqi residents were recruited online for this study (65 females; 123 males). By using social networking sites, they were invited to complete an online questionnaire after filling out the informed consent, participation was voluntary and without monetary or reward, age ranged from 18 to 70 years ($M = 33.30$, $SD = 11.29$). In terms of educational qualifications, 30.3% were still in full time study, 40.2% had an undergraduate degree, 20.7% had a post-graduate degree, and the remainder had some other qualification.

The study had a small sample size therefore G*Power was used to reveal the sample size power of Pearson's correlation and the moderated regression analyses. A sensitivity power analysis was run for the Pearson correlation and showed that a Pearson's correlation coefficient with 188 participants would be sensitive to effects of $r = 0.20$ with 80% power ($\alpha = .05$, two-tailed). This means the study would not be able to reliably detect correlations smaller than $r = 0.20$. For the moderated regression analyses also sensitivity power analysis was run and showed that a moderated regression analyses coefficient with 188 participants would be sensitive to effect size of $f^2 = 0.08$ with $\alpha = 0.05$ and number of predictors = 2.

Table 1. Frequency and percentages of the sample based on sex

	Frequency	Percent
Male	124	65.6
Female	65	34.4
Total	189	100.0

Measures

Belief in Conspiracy Theories

Belief in conspiracy theories was a useful measure of conspiracist ideation, measured using the 15-item Generic Conspiracist Beliefs scale (GCB: Brotherton, French & Pickering, 2013), which was psychometrically validated. Participants rated each item on a 5-point Likert-type scale (1: definitely not true, 2: probably not true, 3: not sure/cannot decide, 4: probably true, 5: definitely true). Participants with greater scores mean that the individuals have a strong belief in conspiracy theories. In the current study Cronbach alpha = .83.

Political Powerlessness

Political powerlessness was measured using the 4-item Index of Political Efficacy scale (Campbell et al,1954) designed to measure sense of political powerlessness (Harris,1955),which was developed to range from 1 (low efficacy) to 5 (high efficacy), in the current study Cronbach alpha =.54.

Political Apathy

Political apathy was measured using the four items from (Pinkleton & Austin, 2004) on a 5-point Likert-type scale with strongly disagree and strongly agree, while past studies used a 7-point Likert-type scale (Pinkleton & Austin, 2004; Pinkleton et al., 2012), In the current study Cronbach alpha =.78.

Procedure

The study received ethical approval from the University's Department of Education and Psychology Ethics Committee. The GCB scale, as well as the political powerlessness and political apathy scales, were translated into Arabic from their parent English versions using the standard back-translation technique, and the translation was then sent to 30 people in the research community for feedback on readability and clarity of the items. An independent bilingual translator resolved linguistic and semantic issues in translation. Participants took measures online after being informed that the study's goal was to learn about their thoughts on a variety of world events and attitudes. They were also asked to determine their gender and read the items attentively at the start of the study. The results of the study were analyzed using the SPSS statistical (version 23).

RESULTS

Descriptive

Participants expressed considerable support for conspiracy theories, as well as for political powerlessness. Also, the participants felt a strong sense of powerlessness regarding political apathy in their lives, with a high score on the political apathy scale (see table 5).

Table 5. Descriptive Statistics

Measures	Mean	SD
BC	3.70	.86
PP	3.88	.99
PA	3.63	1.14

Note. SD= Standard Deviation, BC= Belief in Conspiracy Theories, PP= Political Powerlessness, PA= Political Apathy

Associations between political powerlessness, political apathy, and belief in conspiracy theories

There are bivariate correlations between all three variables studied in this study. Belief in conspiracy theories was associated with political powerlessness [$r = .39^{**}$, $p < .001$] and political apathy [$r = .30^{**}$,

$p < .001$]. In addition, bivariate correlation between political powerlessness with political apathy was [$r = .44^{**}$, $p < .001$]. In general correlations between belief in conspiracy theories and political powerlessness were of a medium effect size, as were correlations between political powerlessness and political apathy.

The regression approaches were adopted. First, political apathy (criterion) was predicted by believing in conspiracy theories (predictor) $\beta = .30$, $t = 4.36$, $p < .001$, $Adj-R^2 = .08$. Belief in conspiracy theories also predicted political powerlessness (mediator); $\beta = .39$, $t = 5.70$, $p < .001$, $Adj-R^2 = .14$. As well another path, political powerlessness predicted political apathy; $\beta = .44$, $t = 6.62$, $p < .001$, $Adj-R^2 = .19$. The mediation model explained 30% of the variation in political apathy. Other elements appear to contribute to political apathy, where both believing in conspiracy theories and political powerlessness can predict political apathy.

Table 6. Multiple Regression Analysis

Model	Unstandardized Coefficients		95.0% Confidence Interval		
	Estimate	SE	p	LL	UL
CB	.081	.036	.025	.010	.151
PP	.518	.098	.000	.325	.711

Note. CB= conspiracy beliefs, PP= political powerlessness, LL=Lower Limit, UL=Upper Limit

Then, using a multiple linear regression model with political apathy as the criterion variable and the remaining two variables (belief in conspiracy theories and political powerlessness) as predictors. When Belief in Conspiracies was combined with Political Powerlessness in a regression model, the relationship between Belief in Conspiracies and Political Apathy was reduced but stayed significance predictor ($\beta = .16$, $t = 2.26$, $p = .025$), while Political powerlessness remained a significant predictor ($\beta = .37$, $t = 5.31$, $p = .001$).Generally, the regression model was significant, $F(2, 185) = 24.98$, $p < .001$, $Adj. R^2 = .20$. Mediation effect was confirmed by a Sobel test ($z = 4.29$; $p < .001$), as shown in Fig. 1.

The normal distribution of political apathy for the individuals in the study sample was also extracted and is shown in Figure 2. The figure shows that political apathy had a normal distribution.

DISCUSSION

Iraqi society, as part of the Middle East, has gone through many periods of political and economic instability, and this society's share of instability has been several destructive wars, and the conditions for conflicts and unrest are typically conducive to the development and formation of conspiracy theories.




Fig 1. The relationship between Belief in conspiracy theories and Political domain is mediated by Political powerlessness.




Figure 2. Normal distribution of the residuals of study sample on linear Regression of political apathy




Figure 3. Histogram of standardized residuals of study sample on linear Regression of political apathy.

The current study's findings imply that conspiracy theory belief is linked to political apathy, and that this relationship is mediated by political powerlessness. Political apathy and political powerlessness have both been utilized as "indicators for potential participation in political engagement" by researchers (Yamamoto&Kushin, 2013). As previously stated, individuals with political apathy are more cynical, resulting in a lack of interest in political affairs and reduced voting efficacy (Austin & Pinkleton, 1995; Jolley& Douglas, 2014). As previously stated, the annual gradual decrease in participation rates in Iraqi elections (Austin & Pinkleton, 1995; Jolley& Douglas, 2014). (Mansour&Toorn, 2018; Musawy, 2018). Correlational studies reveal nothing concerning the causal relationship between conspiracy theories and political apathy.

The study also found that political powerlessness completely moderated the influence of conspiracy theories belief on political apathy. This shows that believing in conspiracy theories may enhance feelings that one's political involvement will have minimal impact, which may lead to a reduction in one's desire to participate in political activities. Pessimism, lack of confidence, a general attitude of frustration, and hopelessness about voting have all been identified as expressions of political power-

lessness among Iraqi citizens in various reports and studies (NCCI, 2011; Mansour & Toorn, 2018; NDI, 2018; Eriksson& Khaleel, 2018). As a result of their sense of political powerlessness, it appears that members of the research community have gravitated toward political apathy, as evidenced by a variety of earlier study (Rosenberg, 1951; Dean, 1965; Dahl et al, 2017). Political apathy is a by-product of political powerlessness, rather than a direct result of belief in conspiracy theories. Individuals who have faith in conspiracy theory may engage with political apathy as a result of feeling powerless to influence or change the political situation. Also it appears that not only conspiracy beliefs are associated with the sense of political powerlessness, but that conspiracy beliefs are also associated with the sense that political do not matter. Again, a potential explanation might be that political apathy allows individual not to suffer from political powerlessness.

About the explained variance in the current study, conspiracy theories are not new to Iraqi society. There are two primary theoretical directions on the question of causation in the relationship between powerlessness and belief in conspiracy theories: The first school of thought believes that feelings of powerlessness can lead to

a stronger belief in conspiracy theories, whereas the second group believes that conspiracy theories make people feel powerlessness (Uscinski & Parent, 2014). Before the events of 2003, Iraq's former administration fostered a conspiratorial environment, which was symbolized by the dictatorship seeding notions about numerous countries and locations conspiring against Iraq and its people (Gray, 2010). This atmosphere has bolstered the region's successive wars, which is playing a key role in Iraq. In particular, it appears that conspiracy theories beliefs interfere with some political factors, limiting formal political activity. Studies conducted on samples of Iraqi society revealed that many people were disappointed in the political process and that there was a severe lack of political trust between Iraqi voters and the ruling parties, as well as political frustration that people felt from Iraqi society. As described in the preceding paragraphs, Iraqi society has reached a point of political helplessness and incapacity to change the current political system after years of recurrent political frustrations. The growth of conspiracy theories, especially in light of their quick diffusion via social media, combined with a sense of political powerlessness, are two characteristics that contribute to political apathy behavior. The new study fills a significant gap in the literature on conspiracy theories in the Middle East in general, and Iraq in particular, since no previous studies have addressed this popular issue among locals.

There were two limitations, because of the small sample size, the current study was unable to explore and cover various conspiracy ideas, and cross-sectional data does not allow us to experimentally test the causal process through which political apathy usage and conspiracy views become associated. Other sorts of conspiracy theories can be researched in future studies, as the current research is preliminary in the research community.

There are alternative explanations to the findings of the study given here. Belief in conspiracy theories leads a person believe that there are powerful groups or parties controlling various elements of life and managing the universe, including politics. They believe they are powerless to govern and control events and are ruled by outside forces. Another idea is that belief in conspiracy theories influences political apathy through mediating characteristics known to influence it, such as nationalist or religious polarization, illogical thinking, and hopelessness.

Civil society organizations and educational institutions can help citizens understand the dangers of these views in terms of political engagement. Other sorts of conspiracy theories, such as those involving social groupings (e.g., anti-Islamic conspiracy theories) or the Zionist Occupation Government conspiracy theory need to be researched.

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APPENDIX

The questionnaires consist of items in which you have to carefully read each item and check what best describes you.

Please complete personal information first and then respond to each statement by marking a circle to indicate how much you agree or disagree with the statement ranges from five responses.

Personal information

Gender:

Educational qualifications:

ENGLISH	ARABIC
Generic Conspiracist Beliefs Scale (GCBS)	مقياس الاعتقاد بنظريات المؤامرة
1-The government is involved in the murder of innocent citizens and/or well-known public figures, and keeps this a secret.	- الحكومة متورطة في قتل مواطنين أبرياء و / أو شخصيات عامة معروفة ، وتبقي هذا الأمر سرا.
2. The government permits or perpetrates acts of terrorism on its own soil, disguising its involvement.	- تسمح الحكومة أو ترتكب أعمالاً إرهابية على أراضيها وتتكبر مساهمتها فيها.
3. The government uses people as patsies to hides its involvement in criminal activities.	- تستغل الحكومة الناس البسطاء لإخفاء تورطها في أنشطة إجرامية.
4. The power held by heads of state is second to that of small, unknown groups who really control world politics.	- إن السلطة التي يمتلكها رؤساء الدول تأتي في المرتبة الثانية بعد تلك التي تتمتع بها الجماعات الصغيرة غير المعروفة التي تتحكم في السياسة العالمية.
5. A small, secret group of people is responsible for making all major world decisions, such as going to war.	- مجموعة صغيرة وسرية من الناس هي المسؤولة عن اتخاذ جميع القرارات العالمية الكبرى مثل الحرب .
6. Certain significant events have been the result of the activity of a small group who secretly manipulate world events.	- كانت بعض الأحداث المهمة نتيجة نشاط مجموعة صغيرة تتلاعب سراً بالأحداث العالمية.
7. Secret organizations communicate with extraterrestrials, but keep this fact from the public.	- تتواصل المنظمات السرية مع كائنات فضائية ، ولكنها تخفي هذه الحقيقة عن الناس.
8. Evidence of alien contact is being kept from the public.	- الاتصال بالغرباء (الفضائيين او غيرهم) يتم حجبها او اخفائها عن عامة الناس.
9. Some UFO sightings and rumors are planned or staged in order to distract the public from real alien contact.	- يتم ترتيب أو تنظيم بعض مشاهد اوشائعات عن (الصحون الطائرة) من أجل تشتيت الناس عن الاتصال الحقيقي بالفضائيين من قبل بعض الحكومات .
10. The spread of certain viruses and/or diseases is the result of deliberate, concealed efforts of some organizations.	- انتشار بعض الفيروسات و / أو الأمراض هو نتيجة جهود مدروسة ومخفية من بعض المنظمات.
11. Technology with mind-control capacities is used on people without their knowledge.	- تُستخدم التكنولوجيا ذات قدرات التحكم في العقل على الأشخاص دون علمهم.
12. Experiments involving new drugs or technologies are routinely carried out on the public without their knowledge or consent.	- تُجرى التجارب التي تنطوي على عقاقير أو تكنولوجيات جديدة بشكل مستمر على الناس دون علمهم أو موافقتهم.
13. Groups of scientists manipulate, fabricate, or suppress evidence in order to deceive the public.	- تقوم مجموعات من العلماء بالتلاعب بالأدلة أو تلفيقها أو قمعها من أجل خداع الناس.
14. New and advanced technology which would harm current industry is being suppressed.	- يتم قمع التكنولوجيا الجديدة والمتقدمة التي تضر المعامل والصناعة الحالية.
15. a lot of important information is deliberately concealed from the public out of self-interest.	- تقوم الحكومات بإخفاء الكثير من المعلومات المهمة عمدا عن الناس من أجل المصلحة الذاتية لبعض الأشخاص.

ENGLISH	ARABIC
Political powerlessness scale	مقياس العجز السياسي
1- Federal public officials don't much care what people like me think.	- لا أعتقد أن المسؤولين الحكوميين يهتمون كثيرًا بما يعتقدُه الناس مثلي .
2. Voting is the only way that people like me can have any say about how the government runs things.	- التصويت هو الطريقة الوحيدة التي يمكن لأشخاص مثلي أن يقولوا فيها كيف تدير الحكومة الأمور.
3. Sometimes national politics and government seem so complicated that a person like me can't really understand what's going on.	- في بعض الأحيان تبدو السياسة والحكومة معقدة للغاية بحيث لا يستطيع شخص مثلي أن يفهم حقًا ما يحدث.
4. People like me don't have any say about what the government does.	- الناس مثلي ليس لديهم أي رأي حول ما تفعله الحكومة.

ENGLISH	ARABIC
Political apathy scale	مقياس اللامبالاة السياسية
(1) "Voting takes too much time,"	- التصويت في الانتخابات متعب ويستغرق الكثير من الوقت .
(2) "Participating in elections is more trouble than it's worth,"	- المشاركة في التصويت في الانتخابات متعب أكثر مما تستحق .
(3) "Staying informed about the government is too much trouble,"	- متابعة إنجازات الحكومة ونشاطاتها فيها الكثير من المتاعب .
(4) "Keeping up on political issues takes too much time."	- "إن متابعة القضايا السياسية متعب ويستغرق الكثير من الوقت مني .