The aim of the study was to examine the relationships of Level -1/Level -2 visual perspective -taking (VPT -1/VPT -2) with theory of mind (ToM) and executive function (EF). Seventy -six adults aged 18 to 48 years participated in the study. To compare the relationships of the two levels of perspective -taking with the aforementioned abilities, the same stimuli were used in both Level -1 and Level -2 trials of the VPT task. ToM abilities were evaluated with the Strange Story task, and EF using the TMT and WCST tests. It was found that controlling for age -related differences, VPT -1 was not associated with either ToM or such components of EF as executive control and set -shifting. VPT -2 was positively related to ToM, but it was not related to EF. The relationship between VPT -2 and ToM was specific, not mediated by domain -general processing capabilities. The obtained results provide further evidence to support the view that distinct mechanisms underlie Level -1 and Level -2 perspective -taking.
Henri Bergson as well as Gaston Milhaud undertake a radical critique of the conception of radical determinism because they both think that mind is able to act in a free and creative manner. In the article, I examine to what degree their arguments, aimed to prove this autonomy, converge. I inquire whether their endorsement of freedom of the mental acts led the two philosophers to the same conclusions regarding the cognitive extent of the intellect and therefore the parallel description of the status of scientific cognition.
From a historical point of view, Peter F. Strawson’s philosophical studies are an important element within contemporary interdisciplinary investigations of the mind-body problem. The aim of this article is to present and analyze Strawson’s program of descriptive metaphysics, along with the associated conception of persons, that he has proposed. In the second part, I also present his non-reductive naturalism, focusing on two of his analyses that belong to the field of mind-body relations: these concern the problem of other minds, and the question of the nomological reduction of mental states of persons to physical ones (i.e. mind-body identity theory). I then point to several possibilities of using Strawson’s conception of persons in the context of issues raised by other questions linked to the mind-body problem (namely, personal identity as it relates to split-brain persons, and the different phases of a person’s development).
In the submitted study, the author shows that Paul in the propositio (12,1-2) the section of encouragement (12,3-15,13), although he does not use the word syneidēsis directly, but the words used in it refer to him in conjunction with his basic functions and prove in this way how fundamental it is to renew the mind in the right, i.e. salvifically effective, education of Christian conscience. He does so in the encouragement context to make the recipients aware of how important it is to have a renewed mind and conscience in being and continuing to become a Christian in everyday and concrete living as well as practicing faith in Jesus. With propositio, he makes the foundation on which he builds the paraclesical message of the Letter. It clearly states that permanently renewed by the Gospel of God mind, is an absolute condition for an uninterrupted evangelical renewal of conscience. Thus, renewed in this way conscience is the only deity of mercy granted to sinful humanity, which guarantees constant faithfulness to its norms of judgment with God’s justice revealed in Christ, the Son of God, or his absolute righteousness, which is an indispensable condition for achieving eternal salvation.
Dynamic development in children’s research has led to surprising discoveries about the learning and thinking patterns of fetuses, infants and young children. These studies have revolutionized not only our knowledge of children, but also our understanding of the nature of the human mind and brain. Moreover, within this context, it is believed that many areas of adulthood are the result of the experiences and changes that occur during the fetal period and in childhood. These experiences, therefore, are crucial for human development and what people achieve in the following stages of their lives. The results of the research on brain development during the fetal period and during childhood presented here, reveal a new perspective for understanding the essence and nature of the learning process. These studies also strongly suggest that the first two thousand days of a child’s life are critical in developing many basic human skills. Therefore, we must take great care of the quality of environment for a child’s development.
P.F. Strawson and J.L. Austin approach the problem of other minds from different perspectives. Peter Strawson looks at this problem from the perspective of descriptive metaphysics, which largely disregards the concrete situations in which we use mental language. John Austin, on the other hand, believes that to understand what is happening in such situations holds the key to solving the former problem. However, as it turns out, the considerations of both authors in the key fragments rely on similar observations. In addition, Austin’s perspective, which looks at the language from the point of view of its usage, makes it possible to formulate an answer to the Strawson’s critics. This does not exclude the possibility of agreeing with Strawson on the primacy of the reference function of language, if we understand it properly. Ultimately, Strawson and Austin’s approaches do not compete, but complement each other.
Human brain is “the perfect guessing machine” (James V. Stone (2012) Vision and Brain, Cambridge, Mass: The MIT Press, p. 155), trying to interpret sensory data in the light of previous biases or beliefs. Bayesian inference is carried out by three complex networks of the human brain: salience network, central executive network, and default mode network. Their function is analysed both in neurotypical person and Attention Deficit Disorder. Modern human being having predictive brain and overloaded mind must develop social identity, whose evolution went probably through three stages: social selection based on punishment, sexual selection based on reputation, and group selection based on identity.
The aim of this paper is to discuss possible connections between the categories of mind and life. Some authors argue that life and mind are closely connected or even are two sides of the same phenomenon. I analyze and examine this thesis in the light of different approaches to defining life: the metabolic approach (which stresses the importance of self-maintenance and self-making) and the evolutionary approach (which focuses on evolution by natural selection). The first way of defining life is Maturana and Varela' conception of autopoiesis, the second is Korzeniewski's cybernetic definition of life and van Hateren's modified Darwinian definition of life. Especially interesting is the possibility of connecting mind and life in the evolutionary framework. The text does not provide exact results, but rather it proposes possible modes of thinking of the relation of these two categories.
Most philosophers believe that a unified philosophical account of mental and non -mental actions is possible. This article presents two arguments indicating that in fact it is not possible. The first one says that thinking is not an activity. Its formulation, however, is exposed to significant difficulties. The second argument avoids these difficulties and puts forward a different, though sometimes erroneously identified, thesis that mental and non-mental actions differ significantly, and therefore one theory should not be expected to include both phenomena. Acceptance of this result sheds new light on the problems associated with the language of thought and gives promise to a new answer to the question “What is Le Penseur doing?”