This article analyses the practice of the Polish administrative courts with respect to application of the Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties, based on a case study of the judgment of the Voivodship Administrative Court in Warsaw of 6 May 2014 (case no. II SA/Wa 117/14), which concerned the recognition of distance learning degrees awarded by Ukrainian universities pursuant to the 1972 Prague Convention. It is argued herein that the reasoning of the court suffers from four major drawbacks: 1) it is at variance with the text, object and purpose of the Prague Convention; 2) it does not take into account the practice in the application of that treaty; 3) it misinterprets the silence of the preparatory work to the Prague Convention on certain issues; and 4) it is inconsistent with international judicial decisions as regards the interpretation of the “special meaning” of one of the terms used in the Convention.
The content of the study focuses on the issue of the right to work of persons with disabilities from the point of view of the provisions of the Convention on the Rights of Persons with Disabilities adopted by the General Assembly of United Nations in 2006. The article discusses the formal elements of the national system supporting the professional activity of this group of people. The author also presents opinions of various entities, independent of state authorities, on the compatibility of solutions adopted in our country with the philosophy of the Convention.
Gaston Milhaud rejects the principle of contradiction if it is conceived as an absolute and universal rule. He claims that it only holds in some narrowly defined circumstances. According to him, the greater is mental contribution to an act of cognition the more appropriate is the application of the principle of contradiction. My analysis of his views shows that he wanted to emphasize the differences between the objective reality and its mental or linguistic representations rather than undermine the logical principle of contradiction. Parallels can be noted between Milhaud’s views on contradiction and Leon Chwistek’s theory of the multiplicity of realities, as well as Kazimierz Ajdukiewicz’s concept of the cognitive role of language.
The article presents reviews of the European Union regulation on reporting formalities for ships entering the EU ports. It also analyses IMO regulation concerning that matter. Finally, the author exposes the differences between both legal systems and weaknesses of the solutions adopted. In the second part of the article the author discusses the Polish way of the reporting formalities system’s implementation. On the basis of a legal analysis as well as practice of the maritime authorities in Poland, the author finds that the Polish regulations seem to be exemplary.
The principle of nullum crimen sine lege expresses an old idea that only the law can prescribe a particular act as punishable. It is commonly understood as a requirement of sufficient definiteness of an offence, in particular – of a statutory description of an offence before it has been committed (lex scripta, lex praevia), and of clarity and precision in criminal provisions so as to enable an individual to conform with them (lex certa), as well as their strict interpretation (lex stricta). Nowadays the principle is an internationally recognized human right to foreseeable criminalization, guaranteed by, inter alia, Article 7 of the European Convention on Human Rights. However, the European Court of Human Rights seems to formulate two slightly different requirements on its basis, namely that the application of criminal law must be foreseeable for an individual and coherent with the “essence of an offence”. One may question whether this can serve as an adequate “shield” from arbitrariness on the part of State authorities. Nevertheless, the core aim of such a flexible approach is not to promote legal security for potential perpetrators, but to achieve better protection of human rights in general.
Nairobi International Convention on the Removal of Wrecks came into force on 14th April 2015 and has been ratified by now by over 40 states across the world (among them Australia, China, India, South Africa and most of the EU countries). The convention provides legal framework for action taken by the Coastal States aiming at removal of wrecks posing danger or impediment to navigation, as well as to the marine environment, or damage to the coastline or related interests of one or more States. The Convention fills the existing legal gap by enabling the States to remove wrecks beyond their territories (as well as within if States decide so). Beside the existing international regulations like Intervention Convention or UNCLOS, the Nairobi Convention clarifies the Costal State’s rights to remove wrecks from its EEZ if they pose a danger for safe navigation or marine environment. The Convention corresponds with mentioned conventions but also equips Coastal States with new legal instruments to deal with hazardous wrecks beyond their territory. The aim of the paper is to analyse the new rights and duties of states, as well as scope of the notion of navigational and environmental threats causes by wrecks. It will refer also to regulatory problems faced by the states implementing the Convention. Even if the Convention is to be applied to territorial sea, its multiple provisions are not. Moreover, the Convention leaves many important aspects unregulated. Those issues will be analysed from the perspective of a country which has not yet ratified the Convention, and will be confronted with the experience from other jurisdictions.
This article attempts to discover the key elements of the democratic principle, as described by the judges sitting in Luxembourg and Strasbourg, whose case law reveals the underlying idea of democracy at the supranational level. Until recently the debate on democracy was limited to the national level. But things are changing, and this article shows the gradual emergence of a process led by supranational courts, in which the application of the democratic principle finds multiple grades and variations. In this way the supranational/international courts have opened a new chapter in the process of constitutionalization of international law.
This article provides an overview of “memory laws” in Europe, reflecting upon what may be called the “asymmetry” of such laws. It then looks at the special case of Poland and its troubled experience with memory laws; it considers the question of whether, in the eyes of the law – genocide, and in particular the Holocaust – is so “special” that its public denials warrant legal intervention. It also looks at the case law of the European Court of Human Rights and its (not necessarily coherent) “doctrine” on memory laws and their consistency, or otherwise, with the European Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms (and in particular with freedom of expression as laid down in Art. 10). The article concludes by asserting that even if we take the law as an indicator of European public memory, there is no consensus on the past, except perhaps for the special case of the Holocaust. The main challenge lies in determining whether memory laws, defined by some as social engineering and the imposition of “imperative” versions of memory, are consistent with the principles inherent in open, democratic and free societies in Europe. This challenge remains unmet.
This article examines the occasional verse published by the daily Czas [Time] in 1864–1879, i.e. over a decade and a half after the suppression of the January Rising. These texts, which feature both solemn occasions and local ephemera, present us with a unique chronicle of life of Cracow and its environs. In addition to listing all the relevant texts, the article attempts to identify their authors, i.e. unlock their initials or pseudonyms, to outline the conventions and genological peculiarities of that verse, and to gauge the attitudes of the Cracovians towards the question of Poland’s independence, Romanticism, patriotism as well as some well-known authority figures.
Article published in Science, 2012 by Jennifer A. Doudna, Emmanuelle Charpentier and their team presented a novel tool named as CRISPR/Cas9. The original CRISPR/Cas9 tool and the whole system developed from it since then allow making precise changes in the nucleotide sequence in the defined locus of the genome. The article presents the already known as well the potential future applications of the system for improvement of cultivated plants. The separate section is devoted to present the background of the Court of Justice decision C-528/16. Discussed are the far reaching negative consequences of this, based not on the merit decision, for the future of European green biotechnology.